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Professor Einer Elhauge's provocative article, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and
the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 397
(2009), contests two propositions on which efficiency-minded antitrust
scholars have largely agreed. (1) that there should be no tying liability absent
substantial tied market foreclosure (a position contrary to the legal status
quo), and (2) that courts should recognize a safe harbor for any bundled
discount that results in above-cost pricing that could be matched by an equally
efficient, single-product rival. Elhauge maintains that tie-ins that do not cause
substantial tied market foreclosure may nonetheless occasion adverse
"power" effects that the U.S. Supreme Court has properly deemed to be
anticompetitive. Those power effects may also result, Elhauge argues, from
bundled discounts (even "above-cost" bundled discounts) that involve
artificial inflation of the unbundled "linking" product price. These conclusions
lead Elhauge to defend prevailing tying doctrine and to advocate a bundled
discount rule that eschews price-cost comparisons and instead focuses on
whether the discounter has raised the unbundled price of its linking product
above but-for levels.
This Article asserts a comprehensive response to Elhauge's arguments. With
respect to tying, the Article shows that governing Supreme Court precedent
does not deem the nonforeclosure "power" effects of the practice to be
anticompetitive and that those effects are unlikely to reduce social welfare in
the long run, especially after accounting for dynamic efficiencies. With respect
to bundled discounting, the Article shows that Elhauge's proposed liability
rule is both inapposite to consumer harm and inadministrable and that both
"linked" market foreclosure and a form of below-cost pricing are necessary
for anticompetitive harm and should therefore be prerequisites to antitrust
liability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Tying-a monopolist's sale of its monopoly "tying" product on the
condition that the buyer also purchase some other "tied" product-has long
been subject to antitrust scrutiny2 and has generated a tremendous volume of
scholarly commentary. 3 Bundled discounting-a seller's charging less for a
package of disparate products than the aggregate price it would charge for the
products if purchased separately 4-has a shorter history of antitrust scrutiny but
has recently attracted a substantial amount of attention from regulators and
scholars.5 While antitrust commentators are far from consensus on the proper
1 See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) ("[A] tying arrangement
may be defined as an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that
the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not
purchase that product from any other supplier.").2 See id. at 1; Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
3 The scholarly literature on tying is far too voluminous to cite exhaustively. For a
detailed overview of the issues addressed in the scholarship, see 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2004); 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT
HOVENKAMP & EINER ELHAUGE, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2004). Volumes X and X of the
seminal Areeda treatise are devoted to consideration of tying arrangements and related
practices.
4 See Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1688,
1689 (2005) (defining bundled discounting).
5 See, e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 94-
100 (2007) [hereinafter AMC REPORT]; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND
MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 91-106 (2008)
[hereinafter BUSH DOJ SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT REPORT] (abrogated by Obama Justice
Department, see Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report
on Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009)); Dennis W. Carlton et al., Assessing the
Anticompetitive Effects of Multiproduct Pricing, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 587 (2008); Daniel A.
Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 EMORY L.J. 423 (2006);
David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from
Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 37 (2005);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion, 2006 UTAH L. REv. 841; Bruce H.
Kobayashi, Does Economics Provide a Reliable Guide to Regulating Commodity Bundling
by Firms? A Survey of the Economic Literature, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 707 (2005);
Lambert, supra note 4; Timothy J. Muris & Vernon L. Smith, Antitrust and Bundled
Discounts: An Experimental Analysis, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 399 (2008); Barry Nalebuff,
Exclusionary Bundling, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 321 (2005).
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legal treatment of either practice, efficiency-minded scholars have largely
agreed upon a couple of general principles in recent years. With respect to
tying, scholars from both the relatively laissez-faire Chicago School and the
more interventionist Harvard School6 have endorsed the view, contrary to the
legal status quo, that liability should result only if the tie-in arrangement results
in significant foreclosure of marketing opportunities in the tied product market.7
On bundled discounting, most efficiency-minded commentators appear to have
concluded that there should be a safe harbor for bundled discounts that are not
too deep--that are in some sense (and the commentators have not agreed on the
precise sense) "above-cost. ' 8 .
In his recent, widely noted article Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death
of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory,9 Professor Einer Elhauge challenges each
of these broadly agreed-upon principles. With respect to tying, Elhauge largely
defends the legal status quo under which antitrust liability results, regardless of
the degree of tied market foreclosure occasioned by the tie-in, as long as the
seller has monopoly power in the tying product market and the tie-in affects a
substantial dollar volume (not percentage of marketing opportunities) in the tied
product market. 10 This approach generally makes sense, he argues, because
even instances of tying that fail to cause substantial tied market foreclosure may
6For a description of the Chicago and Harvard (and post-Chicago) Schools, see
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 31-39
(2005).7 See, e.g., 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1701, at 26; id. 1703d3, at 38;
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 198 (2d ed. 2001) ("A striking deficiency of the
traditional 'leverage' theory of tie-ins ... [is] its failure to require any proof that a monopoly
of the tied product [is] even a remotely plausible consequence of the tie-in."); HOVENKAmP,
supra note 6, at 201-06; BUSH DOJ SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT REPORT, supra note 5, at 89-90
(2008) (collecting sources).
8 See, e.g., AMC REPORT, supra note 5, at 12, 83, 99-100; BUSH DOJ SINGLE-FIRM
CONDUCT REPORT, supra note 5, at 101-02; Crane, supra note 5, at 474-75; Hovenkamp,
supra note 5, at 852-54; Lambert, supra note 4, at 1691 n.15; Muris & Smith, supra note 5,
at 425; Nalebuff, supra note 5, at 328-43.
9 Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly
Profit Theory, 123 HARv. L. REV. 397 (2009). Based on his article, the American Antitrust
Institute awarded Elhauge the Jerry S. Cohen Award for best antitrust scholarship in 2009.
See Press Release, Harvard Law Sch. Office of Commc'ns, Elhauge Receives Jerry S. Cohen
Award for Best Antitrust Scholarship of 2009 (May 6, 2010), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2010/05/06_elhague.html. Even before it was published,
antitrust scholars recognized the significance of Elhauge's article. In its Autumn 2009 issue,
the antitrust journal Competition Policy International hosted a symposium on the piece. See
A Symposium on Antitrust and the Global Economic Crisis, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L,
Autumn 2009, at 3.
10 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 425 ("[T]ying doctrine correctly requires proof of the
elements necessary to achieve anticompetitive effects."). For the elements of liability under
prevailing tying doctrine, see infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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create nonforeclosure "power" effects that the Supreme Court has properly
deemed to be anticompetitive.II
Elhauge's proposed treatment of bundled discounts builds upon his tying
analysis. For any bundled discount in which the unbundled price of the
monopoly (or, as he terms it, the "linking") product exceeds the unbundled
price that would have prevailed absent the discounting scheme (the "but-for"
price), Elhauge would simply treat the discount as a de facto tie-in and invoke
his proposed tying analysis. 12 For a bundled discount in which the unbundled
price of the linking product does not exceed the but-for price, liability would
turn on the degree to which the discount forecloses marketing opportunities in
the market for the nonmonopoly, or "linked," product. 13 Notably, Elhauge
would recognize no safe harbor for bundled discounts that result in an above-
cost price for the bundled products, even if the nonmonopoly linked product is
priced above cost after the entire amount of the bundled discount is attributed to
that product. 14 Elhauge's recommended approach is thus substantially more
prohibitory than either the approach recommended by the Antitrust
Modernization Commission 15 or that set forth in the U.S. Department of
Justice's now-abrogated Section 2 Report. 16
This Article critiques Elhauge's proposed treatment of tying and bundled
discounts. With respect to tying, Elhauge makes both descriptive and normative
mistakes. As a descriptive matter, he incorrectly asserts that current legal
doctrine treats the so-called power (i.e., nonforeclosure) effects of tying, which
Chicago School antitrust scholars have long acknowledged, 17 as the sort of
anticompetitive harm that is properly policed by the antitrust laws.18 As a
normative matter, he errs in concluding that antitrust should police such
effects. 19 The better view is that antitrust should reach only the extension-not
the mere exercise--of market power (or, as others have put it, should permit
" See Elhauge, supra note 9, at 404-13 (discussing nonforeclosure "power" effects of
tying); id. at 420-26 (arguing that Supreme Court precedent deems nonforeclosure power
effects to be anticompetitive); id. at 426-42 (arguing that power effects should be deemed
anticompetitive); id. at 425 ("Given [the Supreme Court's] conclusion that the power effects
are anticompetitive, the focus on tying market power and tied dollar amount does not mean
that the doctrine fails to require evidence of anticompetitive effects."). Elhauge does
advocate reining in tying liability a bit from the status quo: he would require a showing of
substantial tied market foreclosure for tie-ins where (1) the tying and tied products are sold
or used in fixed proportions, and (2) the tied product is useless without the tying product. Id.
at 442-43.
12Id. at 468.
13Id. at 469.
141d. at 461-67 (rejecting all "cost-based" liability tests and safe harbors for bundled
discounts).
15 AMC REPORT, supra note 5, at 12, 83, 99-100.
16 BUSH DOJ SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT REPORT, supra note 5, at 101-02.
17 See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
18 See infra Part III.A (criticizing Elhauge, supra note 9, at 420-26).
19 See infra Part III.B (criticizing Elhauge, supra note 9, at 426-42).
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monopoly "extraction" while policing monopoly "extension"). 20 Such a view
would impose tying liability only when a tie-in creates foreclosure effects.
Of course, if tying's nonforeclosure effects are an insufficient basis for
liability, then much of Elhauge's proposal regarding bundled discounts must
falter. In particular, the mere fact that a seller's unbundled price for its linking
product exceeds the (immensely difficult-to-determine) but-for price should not
be enough either to create liability or to place the burden on the seller to prove
that the bundled discount creates efficiencies in excess of the discount amount.
Rather, bundled discounts should be condemned only if they result in
substantial foreclosure of the linked product market.21 Moreover, because not
all foreclosure of rivals is anticompetitive (for example, a product improvement
that wins business from competitors tends to "foreclose" those rivals but is in no
sense anticompetitive), antitrust tribunals need some means of separating
permissible foreclosure-causing bundled discounts from illicit ones. Some sort
of price-cost test is therefore essential for separating the procompetitive wheat
from the anticompetitive chaff.22
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II sets forth the
theoretical foundation for Elhauge's legal conclusions, briefly summarizing the
arguments that lead to, in his words, "the death of the single monopoly profit
theory."2 3 Part III contests Elhauge's proposed tying analysis and explains why
tied market foreclosure should be a prerequisite to tying liability. Part IV
addresses Elhauge's proposal for evaluating bundled discounts, demonstrating
that his proposed approach asks the wrong question and is both inadministrable
and inapposite to anticompetitive harm. Part IV also explains why a proper
treatment of bundled discounts should focus on anticompetitive foreclosure,
which will inevitably entail the sort of price-cost comparison Elhauge eschews.
Part V concludes.
II. THE THEORY UNDERLYING THE PURPORTED "DEATH OF THE SINGLE
MONOPOLY PROFIT THEORY"
The foundation for Elhauge's proposed legal treatment of tying and bundled
discounts is his criticism of the Chicago School's so-called "single monopoly
profit theory." Responding to the strict per se rule against tying, a rule that arose
from courts' concern that a monopolist could use a tie-in to leverage its
monopoly over the tying product to obtain monopoly profits on a second
product,24 Chicago School theorists maintained that such leveraging is generally
2 0 See Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, Appropriate Antitrust Policy Towards Single-
Firm Conduct (Econ. Analysis Grp. Discussion Paper No. 08-2, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-I 111665.
2 1 See infra Part IV.B.1-3.
2 2 See infra Part IV.B.4-4a.
23 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 403-19.
24 See, e.g., Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 32 (1931)
("The owner of a patent for a machine might thereby [i.e., via tying of supplies for the
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impossible and that a monopolist can attain all available monopoly profits
simply by raising its price for the tying product to monopoly levels.25 These
scholars reasoned that when a consumer decides whether to buy a product, she
tallies the various costs she must incur to obtain that product and determines
whether those costs, taken together, exceed the subjective value she expects to
receive from the product (her reservation price). When a monopolist ties
another product to the sale of its monopoly product, it effectively raises the
price of its monopoly product, especially if it attempts to charge a
supracompetitive price for the tied product. If such tying pushes the effective
price for the monopoly product above the profit-maximizing monopoly price,
the seller's profits will fall. But there is no need to tie in order to raise the
effective price to the profit-maximizing, single-product level; the seller could
simply charge that price for the tying product alone. Thus, a tie-in does not
provide the seller with any additional monopoly profit opportunity. One single
monopoly profit is available, and it can be fully exploited simply by charging
the profit-maximizing price for the monopoly product.2
6
machine] secure a partial monopoly on the unpatented supplies consumed in its operation.").
See generally E. THOMAS SULLIvAN, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & HOWARD A. SHELANSKI,
ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 480 (6th ed.
2009) (observing that the leverage theory, which supposed that a tying monopolist "us[ed]
its power or dominance in the tying product as a 'lever"' to achieve market power in the tied
market, "found acceptance in many Supreme Court opinions, beginning as early as 1917,
and many of these classified ties as illegal per se").2 5 See Ward Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE
L.J. 19, 20 (1957) ("If the tying seller is maximizing his return on the tying product and the
same output of the tied product can still be produced.., no additional or new monopoly
effect should be assumed."); see also ROBERT A. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A
POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 372-75, 380-81 (1978); POSNER, supra note 7, at 197-99;
RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND
OTHER MATERIALS 802-03 (2d ed. 1981); Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the
Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 281, 290-92 (1956); Benjamin Klein, Tying,
in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 630-31 (Peter Newman
ed., 1998); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv.
925, 926 (1979).
26A leading antitrust casebook offers the following example to illustrate the single
monopoly profit argument:
Assume, for example, that a firm has a monopoly in the bolt market but that the nut
market is competitive. Most customers use a nut with a bolt and buy them in equal
numbers. With respect to these customers the profit-maximizing price of the
"package"-a nut and a bolt-is, say, 50 cents. If nuts are being sold at a competitive
price of 10 cents, the monopolist in bolts will maximize his profits by selling bolts for
40 cents. But now suppose that the bolt monopolist uses a tying arrangement: he forces
all purchasers of one of his bolts to take a nut from him as well. What price will he be
able to charge for the nut? The answer is 10 cents, the competitive price. By charging
the profit-maximizing price for the bolt, the bolt monopolist has already extracted all
available monopoly profits from the bolt-nut package. If he attempts to use a tying
20111
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This single monopoly profit theory, Elhauge maintains, depends on several
key assumptions that, he says, are rarely satisfied. Those assumptions are that:
(1) the tying and tied products are used in fixed proportions, (2) there is a strong
positive demand correlation between the tying and tied products, (3) buyers
purchase a fixed number of units of the tying product, (4) the competitiveness
of the tied product market is fixed, and (5) the competitiveness of the tying
product market is fixed.27 Relaxing any of those five assumptions, Elhauge
says, creates conditions under which tying could harm consumers and would be
anticompetitive.28 Thus, he contends, the single monopoly profit theory is na'fve
and incomplete, and the legal conclusion it implies-that tying should be
presumptively legal (or, at a minimum, not per se illegal)-is incorrect.
By relaxing each of the assumptions of the single monopoly profit theory,
Elhauge claims to demonstrate five potential anticompetitive effects of tying.
He divides the effects into two groups depending on whether they require
significant tied market foreclosure. 29
A. The Power (i.e., Price Discrimination) Effects
Three of the purportedly harmful effects do not require substantial
foreclosure of marketing opportunities in the tied product market. Elhauge
refers to such nonforeclosure effects as "power" effects because, he says, they
require merely that the seller possess market power in the tying product
market.30 They might better be termed price-discrimination effects, for they all
involve seller attempts to extract additional surplus via price discrimination, and
arrangement to force customers to take their nuts from him at a price of, say, 15 cents,
he will produce less, not more, monopoly profits.
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 481.
2 7 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 404. Elhauge fails to mention another of the single
monopoly profit theory's assumptions: that the tying product is not used in conjunction with
a complementary product or service that is itself sold in a non-competitive market. When the
tying product is used with such a complement (which, due to the lack of competition, is sold
at a supracompetitive price), the producer may enhance its profits by producing the
complement at issue and tying it in at a competitive (or less supracompetitive) price. See
infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text. See generally Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 958-61 (2010)
(discussing double marginalization and the possible "reverse leveraging" effect of tie-ins).
Tying to eliminate such "double marginalization," while profit-enhancing for the seller, also
tends to benefit consumers. Id.
28 See Elhauge, supra note 9, at 404.
29See id. at 400 (distinguishing "foreclosure share effects," which "require foreclosing
a substantial share of the tied market," from "power effects," which "require only some
existing tying market power").30 See id.
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they do not require antitrust market power (only economic market power,
which is not the same thing). 31
1. Price Discrimination Across Buyers of the Tying Product
The first theory of consumer harm results from relaxing the assumption that
the tying and tied products are sold or used in fixed ratios (i.e., one tied product
per tying product). If the consumption of the tied product is variable, so that
some purchasers of a single tying product use more of the tied product than do
others, and if demand for the tied product is positively correlated with demand
for the tying product, then a tie-in can be used to price discriminate against
consumers who attach a relatively high value to the tying product. 32 For
example, a printer monopolist, reasonably assuming that high-volume users will
attach a higher value to the printer than will low-volume users, may seek to
charge those heavy users a higher effective price by lowering its printer price
from monopoly levels but then requiring that printer buyers also purchase its
ink cartridges at a supracompetitive (above-cost) price. 33
Such a strategy would allow the seller to enhance its profits by charging
heavy (higher valuing) users effective prices that are above the monopoly price
while expanding sales to lighter (lower valuing) users at effective prices that are
below the monopoly level but are still above-cost and hence economically
profitable for the seller. 34 Because this sort of tie-in uses demand for the tied
product to measure expected demand for the tying product, such ties are
typically called "metering" ties.35 Metering ties may be more effective or less
costly than direct price discrimination (i.e., just charging different printer prices
to different consumers) because (1) the seller need not segregate the consumers,
whose reservation prices it does not know, into high-price and low-price
groups; (2) there would be no danger of arbitrage (e.g., low-price buyers'
stockpiling printers and reselling them to high-price buyers at some price less
than that charged by the printer seller); and (3) the seller could avoid liability
for price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act.36
31 See Benjamin Klein & John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination as
an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599,
603-07, 611-19, 624-33 (2003) (explaining that the so-called power effects are simply
instances of generally procompetitive price discrimination and distinguishing economic
market power from antitrust market power).32 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 404-05. While it is not strictly necessary that the tying and
tied products be complements (as long as demand for the products is positively correlated),
the vast majority of tie-ins imposed to accomplish this sort of price discrimination involve
complementary products.
33
Id.
34 1d
"35 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 482.
36 See id. at 482-83.
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Elhauge contends that metering ties, which were first explained by early
Chicago School scholars Aaron Director37 and Ward Bowman 38 and continue to
be acknowledged by scholars aligned with the Chicago School, 39 are
anticompetitive because they result in a form of imperfect price discrimination
that reduces both consumer and total welfare.40 He is wrong. As Part III.B
explains, Elhauge's mistaken assumption that metering ties amount to highly
unrefined, "third-degree" price discrimination and his failure to account for
dynamic efficiencies lead to an incorrect conclusion concerning the welfare
effects of metering tie-ins.41
2. Price Discrimination Across Buyers of Both Products
The second power effect Elhauge documents results from relaxing the
assumption that demand for the tying and tied products is positively
correlated.42 A firm that sells multiple products for which demand is not
positively correlated and that possesses market power over each (so that it may
price each above its marginal cost) will, if it sells its products separately, find its
pricing for each product constrained by the willingness to pay for highly price-
sensitive purchasers (i.e., those exhibiting a high elasticity of demand).43 By
bundling the products for which demand is not positively correlated, the seller
may evade this pricing constraint.4 4
Elhauge offers a complicated example to illustrate this point,45 but the basic
insight is apparent from the following simple example offered by Nobel laureate
George Stigler, the Chicago School scholar who first documented this use of
37judge Posner credits Aaron Director, whom Posner has dubbed "the doyen of
Chicago antitrust thinking," Richard A. Posner, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72
U. CHI. L. REv. 229, 229 (2005), with originally developing the theory of metering via tie-
ins. See POSNER, supra note 7, at 200 n. 15. Ward Bowman also gave Director such credit.
See Bowman, supra note 25, at 19 (crediting Director with first explaining "tying as a
counting device for price discrimination").
38 See Bowman, supra note 25, at 23-24, 33.
39 see, e.g., POSNER, supra note 7, at 200 n.15.40 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 430-34.
41 See infra Part III.B.l-a.ii, Part III.B.2. In general, I defer criticism of Elhauge's
economic analysis to Part III.
42 See Elhauge, supra note 9, at 405-07, 419-20.
43 See POSNER, supra note 7, at 235.
44See George Stigler, United States v. Loew's Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963
SUP. CT. REv. 152-53. While Stigler assumed that demand for the bundled products was
negatively correlated, subsequent work has shown that the theory may apply when demand
is positively correlated, but only weakly. See William James Adams & Janet L. Yellen,
Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, 90 Q.J. ECON. 475, 485 (1976); R.
Preston McAfee et al., Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of
Values, 104 Q.J. ECON. 371, 372-73, 377 (1989); Richard Schmalensee, Gaussian Demand
and Commodity Bundling, 57 J. Bus. S211, S220 (1984).
4 5 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 406.
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tying.46 Assume that a firm sells two unique products, X and Y, and that
different customers value those products by different amounts. Suppose that the
firm has two customers, A and B; that A values product X at $8,000 and product
Y at $2,500; and that B values product Xat $7,000 and product Y at $3,000. (For
simplicity's sake, assume that the marginal cost of both products is zero.)
A's B's
Reservation Reservation
Price Price
Product X $8,000 $7,000
Product Y $2,500 $3,000
If the firm were to sell the products separately, it would charge $7,000 for X
and $2,500 for Y, and it would earn profits of $19,000 ($9,500 * 2). By tying the
products together and selling them as a bundle, the seller can charge a total of
$10,000 per customer, an amount less than or equal to each customer's
reservation price for the package, thereby earning profits of $20,000. While
each consumer is charged the same amount for the package, the pricing is in
some sense discriminatory, for the seller effectively discriminates against A, the
low-elasticity X buyer, on A's purchase of X and against B, the low-elasticity Y
buyer, on B's purchase of y.47 In so doing, the seller may enhance its profits for,
as Judge Posner explains, "When the products are priced separately, the price is
depressed by the buyer who values each one less than the other buyer does; the
bundling eliminates this effect."'48
Focusing solely on static results, Elhauge contends that this sort of "Stigler-
type" tying has ambiguous efficiency effects.49 While he concedes that such
tying may increase total welfare by increasing output, he asserts that it may
nonetheless decrease welfare by allocating some output to buyers who value it
less than those who would have obtained it absent tying and might even value
one tied product at less than its cost.5 0 For example, suppose that the
aforementioned products X and Y have a marginal cost of $100 (rather than
zero, as assumed above). A customer who values product Y at $9,000 but does
not value product X by at least $1,000 would not obtain Y under the $10,000
bundled price mentioned above, even though a customer who values X at
$10,000 and Y at only $50 would do so. Social wealth would be reduced by
46See Stigler, supra note 44, at 153.
47 Absent the tying of X and Y (i.e., with separate pricing), A would have enjoyed
surplus of $1,000 on X but no surplus on Y, and B would have enjoyed surplus of $500 on Y
but no surplus on X.4 8 POSNER, supra note 7, at 235.
4 9 See Elhauge, supra note 9, at 406-07.
50 See id. ("The mixed efficiency effects result because such tying decreases efficiency
by reallocating some output to buyers who value it less than those who would have gotten it
without tying (and might even value one product at less than it costs to make), unless that
allocation inefficiency is offset by an output-increasing efficiency.").
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allocating Y to the latter customer, who actually values it at less than its $100
cost, but not the former, who values it at ninety times its cost.
While this sort of welfare loss is a theoretical possibility, it is more likely
that the increased output resulting from "Stigler-type" bundling would more
than offset any allocative inefficiency, leading to an increase in total welfare.
Part II.B. 1.b explains why this is so and why "Stigler-type" bundling may be
the most efficient means of pricing many low-marginal-cost products. 51
3. Extracting Individual Consumer Surplus
Elhauge maintains that tying may give rise to a third adverse nonforeclosure
effect when buyers purchase multiple units of the tying product. 52 The intuition
behind this purported effect, first explained by Prof. M. L. Burstein, 53 is as
follows:
* Every purchaser of a product values it at least the price she pays.
Usually, the buyer's subjective valuation (reservation price) for the
product will exceed that price, giving her some consumer surplus. That
is true even if the seller charges a monopoly price for the product. Thus,
a monopolist charging a single profit-maximizing price does not capture
all the surplus created by the sale of its product.
* When a buyer purchases multiple units of a tying product at the same
per-unit price, the seller may assume that most units (all but perhaps the
last unit purchased) are being sold for less than the buyer's reservation
price. That is because buyers of multiple units generally devote their
first purchases to their most pressing needs, use later-purchased units
for lower-valued purposes, and therefore experience diminishing
marginal utility as additional units are purchased.
* By selling its monopoly product only on the condition that buyers also
purchase another supracompetitively priced product, a seller may
effectively usurp for itself some of the consumer surplus created by the
sale of multiple units of the tying product. It does so by charging what
is essentially a two-part tariff: the buyer effectively pays one amount
(the surplus she loses from paying a supracompetitive price for the tied
product) in order to obtain the right to purchase units of the tying
product at a monopoly (or supracompetitive) price.
51 See infra Part III.B.1 .b; see also Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 956-
58 (discussing how Stigler-type bundling may increase market output and enhance welfare).52 See Elhauge, supra note 9, at 407-13.
53 M.L. Burstein, The Economics of Tie-In Sales, 42 REV. EcoN. & STAT. 68, 68-69
(1960); M.L. Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 73-91 (1961)
[hereinafter Burstein, Full-Line Forcing]. While Professor Burstein's affiliation with the
Chicago School of antitrust analysis may be debatable, it is worth noting that he received his
J.D., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Chicago in, respectively, 1950, 1955,
and 1957.
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As long as a buyer's expected consumer surplus from her purchases of
tying products at the monopoly (or supracompetitive) price is likely to
exceed the surplus she expects to lose from having to buy the tied
product from the monopolist, the buyer will accept the tie-in and
thereby transfer some of her surplus to the seller.
Working through a series of complicated (and somewhat unrealistic)
examples, Elhauge shows the different ways a monopolist might set prices
under different circumstances in order to extract for itself the maximum amount
of consumer surplus. 54 Under some circumstances, the seller could charge
multi-unit buyers of a tying product a monopoly price for that product and a
monopoly price for the tied product, in which case it could use tying to
transform one monopoly profit into two (though it could not thereby turn a
single monopoly power into two). 55 Under other circumstances, the seller would
maximize its profits by charging a below-monopoly, but still supracompetitive,
price for the tying product and a monopoly or supracompetitive price for the
tied product. 56
In any event, this "Burstein-type" tying resembles metering tying in that the
seller ties a product to its monopoly product and charges a supracompetitive
price for that tied product in order to measure and extract consumer surplus that
would exist absent the tie-in. 57 It differs from a metering tie-in in that it requires
that buyers purchase multiple units of the tying product but does not necessarily
require that the seller lower the price of its tying product below monopoly levels
in order to maximize profits (though a review of the litigated cases reveals no
variable proportion tie-in that did not involve a reduction in the price of the
tying product 58). As Part III.B.2 explains, because "Burstein-type" surplus
extraction increases a seller's reward for developing a product over which it
may price discriminate, it is actually likely to promote competition and enhance
dynamic efficiency.59
B. The Foreclosure Effects
The three aforementioned effects of tying may occur even if the tie-in does
not cause substantial tied market foreclosure. By contrast, the fourth and fifth
54 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 407-13.
55 1d. at 410 (noting circumstances under which "tying does not result in any discount
on the tying product, but does elevate tied prices to monopoly levels," thereby "produc[ing]
precisely the leveraging of one monopoly profit into two monopoly profits that the single
monopoly profit theory said was impossible").56 1d. at 410-11.
57 It also resembles metering price discrimination in that it requires that the tied product
not be used or sold in fixed proportions with the tying product.
58 See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 942-43 (cataloguing cases
involving variable proportion tie-ins and noting apparent absence of cases in which tying
product price was not reduced).
59 See infra Part III.B.2.
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adverse effects Elhauge identifies can occur only if the tie-in at issue forecloses
the tying firm's rivals from a substantial portion of available sales in the tied
product market. Because these so-called "foreclosure effects" require an
increase in the tying firm's output, they are in tension with the aforementioned
power effects, which involve a contraction of output. The foreclosure effects are
further distinguishable in that they, unlike the power effects, may enable the
monopolist to obtain market power-the ability to affect market prices by
withholding output-in another market. They may thus facilitate the extension
of monopoly power, not just the extraction of surplus created by the
monopolist's production of its monopoly product.60
1. Reducing Rival Competitiveness in the Tied Market
The first sort of foreclosure-based harm may result if the tie-in at issue
impairs the ability of tied market rivals to compete with the tying firm. Elhauge
asserts that if the tie-in diverts a large portion of tied market business to the
tying firm, that firm's tied market competitors may be required to reduce their
output below minimum efficient scale,61 which may cause them to face per-unit
costs that are higher than those of their tying rival.62 In addition, the tying
firm's success in winning tied market sales may reduce its tied market rivals'
economies of scope, distribution, supply, research, and learning, and it may
keep those rivals from achieving desirable network effects.63 By reducing the
actual and expected efficiency of existing and prospective tied market
competitors, tying may drive incumbent rivals to exit the tied market and may
prevent entry by new firms. Moreover, Elhauge contends, tying may reduce the
"aggressiveness" of price competition in tied markets: In those tied markets
characterized by Cournot competition, it may cause the tying firm's rivals to
follow one another in reducing output and raising price, and when Bertrand
competition exists, it may create price-enhancing product differentiation.64
Finally, Elhauge contends, tying may reduce tied market rivals' ability to
60 See generally Carlton & Heyer, supra note 20 (distinguishing between firm conduct
that extends market power and that which merely uses such power to extract consumer
surplus and arguing that only the former should be regulated under the antitrust laws).
61 "Minimum efficient scale" is the level of output at which all available economies of
scale are exhausted. Any firm that fails to grow to this level of production will have a
competitive disadvantage against its larger rivals whose output levels exceed minimum
efficient scale.62 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 413-14.
631d. (citing Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L.
REv. 253, 320-24 (2003); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 234-45
(1986); Eric B. Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer & John S. Wiley, Jr., Naked Exclusion, 81 AM.
ECON. REv. 1137, 1138-44 (1991); Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals'
Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 267, 267-70 (1983)).64 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 414.
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expand in response to a price increase.65 This may occur if the tying at issue
effectively shrinks tied rivals by foreclosing them from sales opportunities. 66 In
sum, Elhauge asserts, "a tie that forecloses enough of the tied market can reduce
rival competitiveness by impairing rival efficiency, entry, existence,
aggressiveness, or expandability. ' 67
Despite Elhauge's insinuation to the contrary, the notion that tying may
reduce rival competitiveness in the tied product market is not a novel idea to
members of the Chicago School. Chicago School scholars have long recognized
this possible effect of tie-ins but have generally concluded that real-life
instances in which tying is used to raise tied rivals' costs are rare. As an
empirical matter, tie-ins that are not aimed at eliminating double
marginalization-a procompetitive effect68-generally involve tied
commodities (e.g., salt, dry ice, printer ink, fast food ingredients, etc.) and
therefore cover only a tiny fraction of the tied product market. Accordingly, any
effect dependent on substantially reducing sales opportunities for tied product
rivals will be rare indeed. In his 1976 book on antitrust law, Judge Posner
recognized that tying could result in monopolization of the tied product market,
but he found no evidence that such cases were prevalent:
Only in the rare case where the sale of the tied product for use with the
tying product represents a substantial share of all sales of the tied product
might preventing the independent producers of the tied product from selling it
to the customers of the tying product substantially affect competition in the
market for the tied product. 69
2. Protecting the Degree of Tying Market Power
Elhauge also contends that tying may enhance a monopolist's profits by
"making the degree of tying market power higher than it would have been
without tying."70 He identifies three ways tying might preserve or increase a
651d.
66 Elhauge further observes that reducing tied rival competitiveness may exacerbate the
nonforeclosure surplus squeeze effect (the third so-called power effect). Id. at 415-16.
Elhauge reasons that a prospective buyer of multiple units of a tying product, in deciding
whether to accept a tie-in, does not ask whether his combined surplus on the tying and tied
products, priced supracompetitively, exceeds his surplus on the tied product priced
competitively, but instead whether his combined surplus on the tying and tied products,
priced supracompetitively, exceeds the surplus he would obtain if he bought the tied product
at prices that are inflated because the tie has raised tied market rivals' costs. Thus, to the
extent tying raises prices in the tied product market and reduces the consumer surplus
experienced by buyers who forego the tie, consumers will be more likely to accept the tie-in.
Id. 67 1d. at 413.
68 See supra note 27; infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
6 9 RCHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 175 (1976).
70 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 417.
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monopolist's tying market power.71 First, he argues, tying may deter or delay
entry into the tying market.72 He contends that competitors in a tied market are
among the firms most likely to enter the tying market but may be weakened by
tied market foreclosure occasioned by the tie-in.73 In addition, if the tying
product is normally used in conjunction with the tied product, a foreclosure-
induced impairment of the tied product market makes entry into the tying
product market less attractive.74 Second, Elhauge argues, tied products are often
partial substitutes for tying products, so foreclosure of the tied market tends to
suppress competition from substitutes. 75 When the technological trend is away
from the tying product and toward the tied product, the monopolist may use
tying to foreclose rivals from the tied market and thereby "develop new market
power over the technology of the future." 76
C. The Combined Implications of the Power and Foreclosure Effects
Each of the potential power and foreclosure effects discussed above has
been recognized in the economic literature, 77 frequently by Chicago School
scholars.78 Elhauge contends, though, that "their combined implications have
71 Id.
72 1d. at 417-18.
73 1d. at 417 ("[R]ecent literature shows that successful tied product makers are often
more likely to evolve into tying product makers in future periods, in which case a firm has
incentives to foreclose rivals in the tied market in order to prevent or reduce the erosion of
its tying market power over time.").
74 1d. ("[A] rival is often more likely to enter the tying market if buyers have attractive
rival options in the tied market, especially if both products are essential inputs into some
larger operation.").75 Id. at 418. For example, one of the allegations in the Microsoft case was that a web
browser, the tied product, could be a partial substitute for an operating system, the tying
product, and that Microsoft therefore sought to foreclose the market for browsers by tying its
own browser to its monopoly operating system. See WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA,
THE MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 29-32
(2007) (discussing "guiding narrative" of Microsoft case).76 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 419. While Elhauge refers to this situation as a third one in
which tying may enhance market power in the tying product market, any enhancement of
market power would actually occur in the tied, not the tying, market.
771d. at 420 ("[E]ach of these effects has individually been recognized in the economic
literature ... ").
78 The effect Elhauge dubs "intraproduct price discrimination" was first recognized by
Chicago School scholars Aaron Director and Ward Bowman. See supra notes 37-39 and
accompanying text. The effect he calls "interproduct price discrimination" was first
recognized by George Stigler, a Chicago School scholar. See supra notes 44-46 and
accompanying text. Use of tying "to extract individual consumer surplus" was recognized by
M.L. Burstein, who received his J.D., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees from the University of
Chicago. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. Judge Posner, following Chicagoans
before him, recognized that tie-ins may theoretically produce market power in the tied
market by raising tied rivals' costs. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. And none
other than Robert Bork publicly disparaged Microsoft (albeit, as a paid consultant to
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not been appreciated. ' 79 If the ratio of tied to tying products is not fixed, then a
tie-in may cause the first power effect (price discrimination across buyers of the
tying product). Absent strong positive correlation between demand for the tying
product and the tied product, the second power effect (price discrimination
across buyers of both products) may result. If the tie-in causes substantial
foreclosure in the tied product market, then the arrangement may cause either or
both foreclosure effects (enhancement of market power in the tied and/or tying
markets). Thus, Elhauge reasons, tying can be assumed not to have
anticompetitive effects only when the tie-in at issue combines three features: (1)
a fixed ratio between tying and tied products, (2) strong positive demand
correlation between the tying and tied products, and (3) no substantial
foreclosure of rivals from the tied product market.80
Because these criteria are rarely all satisfied, Elhauge concludes, the
prevailing liability rule, which deems a tie-in illegal as long as the defendant
possesses market power in the tying product market, is generally appropriate.
81
And because many bundled discounts have coercive effects that render them
tantamount to tie-ins, he argues, a similar liability rule (rather than one that
compares the cost and effective price of the items in the bundle) should govern
bundled discounting. 82
The following Parts set forth in more detail, and then critique, Professor
Elhauge's conclusions about the appropriate liability rules governing tying and
bundled discounts. Part III addresses tying; Part IV, bundled discounts.
Netscape) for allegedly using tying to weaken tied market competitors that might try to enter
the tying market. See, e.g., Robert Bork, Browser Bork Replies, SLATE (Dec. 30, 1998),
http://www.slate.com/id/12059/ (summarizing "the case against Microsoft's attempted
destruction of the Netscape browser in order to defend its monopoly in operating systems").
Any insinuation that the Chicago School has been blind to the theories Elhauge discusses is
simply wrong. For the most part, though, Chicago School scholars have concluded that the
theoretical effects Elhauge emphasizes are unlikely to materialize in actual practice and
therefore should not dictate the liability rule applicable to tying. See, e.g., supra note 69 and
accompanying text.79 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 420.80 Id. at 419-20.
81 Id. at 421 ("If one.., assumes that the power effects are anticompetitive, then the
quasi-per se rule nicely fits the conditions for proving anticompetitive effects."). Given his
conclusion about the circumstances in which tying could occasion no anticompetitive effect,
see supra note 80 and accompanying text, Elhauge would create an exception to the quasi-
per se rule and would require a showing of substantial tied market foreclosure when (1) the
tying and tied products are sold or used in fixed proportions, and (2) the tied product is
useless without the tying product. See Elhauge, supra note 9, at 443.82 1d. at 450-51.
2011]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
III. WHY TIED MARKET FORECLOSURE SHOULD BE A PREREQUISITE TO
TYING LIABILITY
Under current antitrust doctrine, an instance of tying is illegal if it involves
truly separate tying and tied products, the defendant possesses market power in
the tying product market, and the tie-in affects a "not insubstantial" dollar
volume (not percentage) of commerce in the tied product market.83 This
liability rule is commonly referred to as a "quasi-per se rule" because the
plaintiff must establish something more than the mere occurrence of the
business practice, but once it does so, liability is imposed regardless of market
effect.84 As noted, efficiency-minded scholars from both the Chicago and
Harvard Schools of antitrust analysis have criticized this rule for being overly
prohibitory and have argued that a tying plaintiff should have to establish, at a
minimum, that the tie-in threatens foreclosure of a substantial percentage of
marketing opportunities in the tied product market.85 Such an approach, these
scholars say, would reconcile tying doctrine with economic learning and would
harmonize the liability rules on tying and exclusive dealing, a salutary
development since many business practices may be alternatively classified as
either tie-ins or instances of exclusive dealing.86
Elhauge maintains that these critics are mistaken and that the current
liability rule is appropriate. He contends that tying's so-called power effects,
which ultimately amount to price discrimination and surplus extraction, may
exist even in the absence of substantial tied market foreclosure and are
sufficient in themselves to warrant imposition of liability. 87 As a legal matter,
he argues, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that these effects are
8 3 Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Fortner 1), 394 U.S. 495, 501, 503 (1969);
see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992).
Notably, the requirement that the tie-in affect a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce in
the tied product market does not require substantial-or anything more than de minimis-
foreclosure of that market. See Fortner 1, 394 U.S. at 501 ("The requirement that a 'not
insubstantial' amount of commerce be involved makes no reference to the scope of any
particular market or to the share of that market foreclosed by the tie .... [N]ormally the
controlling consideration is simply whether a total amount of business, substantial enough in
terms of dollar-volume so as not to be merely de minimis, is foreclosed to competitors by the
tie .... ).84 Contrary to Elhauge's assertion, there is no general efficiencies defense under the
quasi-per se rule. See infra Part III.B.3.85 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
86 See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 198-206 (observing that tied market
foreclosure is a prerequisite to efficiency losses from tying and that many business practices,
such as requirements that franchisees purchase their inputs from franchisors, may
alternatively be characterized as tie-ins (i.e., in order to license the franchisor's intellectual
property, the franchisee must also purchase the franchisor's materials) or instances of
exclusive dealing (i.e., the franchisee agrees to purchase its inputs exclusively from the
franchisor)).87 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 420-21.
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anticompetitive. 88 As a policy matter, he says, the Court was right to do SO. 89
He is wrong on both counts.
A. Tying's Price-Discrimination Effects Are Not "Anticompetitive"
Under Governing Supreme Court Precedent.
In support of his claim that Supreme Court precedent deems tying's
nonforeclosure, price-discrimination effects to be anticompetitive, Elhauge cites
both tying doctrine itself and several specific statements in Supreme Court
opinions. He begins with doctrine, arguing that the legal test for tying liability
(per se illegality if the defendant has market power in the tying product market
and the tie-in affects a not insubstantial volume of commerce in the tied
market)90 makes sense only if tying's price-discrimination effects are
considered anticompetitive:
[T]he power effects do not require a substantial tied foreclosure share, but they
do require tying market power. Further, the extent to which the power effects
harm consumer welfare turns on the dollar amount of the tied market covered,
rather than on the tied market foreclosure share.
Thus, the quasi-per se rule makes perfect sense if the power effects are
deemed anticompetitive, but no sense if they are not. If we restrict ourselves to
the traditional legal question of figuring out which normative theory best fits
the legal doctrine, treating Supreme Court precedent as authoritative, then the
clear answer is that the doctrine must embrace the proposition that the power
effects are anticompetitive. 91
Of course, this assumes that the Supreme Court has succeeded in crafting a
liability test that is narrowly tailored to prevent only those effects it deems
anticompetitive. In reality, there is frequently a disconnect between the liability
rule the Court adopts and the policy concerns underlying that rule. This is
especially true in antitrust, where developments in economic theory precede the
evolution of the law, and the legal doctrine changes only as new cases,
presenting narrow legal issues for resolution, come before the Supreme Court
through the common law process.92 Moreover, courts frequently posit antitrust
88 1d. at 420-26.
89 Id at 426-42.
90 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
91 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 421 (footnote omitted).
92 For example, the maximally prohibitory per se rule against vertical minimum resale
price maintenance (RPM), see Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373, 406-09 (1911) (declaring minimum RPM to be illegal per se), overruled by Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007), persisted long after
the Court realized that a number of the effects that initially motivated the rule (e.g.,
interference with dealer freedom, restraints on alienation of chattels) are not, in fact,
anticompetitive. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731-36 (1988)
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liability rules that are over- or under-inclusive out of a concern for minimizing
the sum of decision and error costs. 9 3 With respect to tying, it is possible that
the Court has declined to require a showing of substantial tied market
foreclosure not because it believes anticompetitive harm may result absent such
foreclosure but because it is concerned about excessive decision or error costs.94
While such a concern would likely be misplaced, 95 it may have played a role in
fashioning the Court's liability rule.
Perhaps recognizing the danger of inferring too much about the Court's
policy conclusions from the specific liability rules it has articulated, Elhauge
seeks to buttress his legal argument by pointing to explicit statements in
Supreme Court opinions that, he says, demonstrate that the Court deems tying's
price-discrimination effects to be anticompetitive. 96 The most direct such
statement first appeared in a dissenting opinion but was later quoted in majority
opinions of the Supreme Court. In Fortner I, dissenting Justice White, joined by
Justice Harlan, purported to state "the rationale on which the illegality of tying
(rejecting much of the theoretical underpinning of Dr. Miles). It would have been fallacious
to argue in 2006, the year before the per se rule was overruled, that the persistence of the
rule proved that the Supreme Court deemed some or all of these effects to be
anticompetitive. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761-62 n.7
(1984) (declining to overrule Dr. Miles not because the Court believed minimum RPM to be
always or almost always anticompetitive but because the issue had not been properly
presented through the appellate review process).
93 For example, the governing test for predatory pricing liability approves some
instances of low but above-cost pricing that, by the Supreme Court's own admission, could
be anticompetitive. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 223 (1993) (acknowledging that some instances of low but above-cost pricing may
harm competition, but permitting such pricing in order to avoid overdeterrence). One should
not infer from the Court's rule, which rests in large part on a concern to avoid error costs,
see id., that the Court has concluded that low but above-cost prices can never be
anticompetitive. On the other hand, naked price fixing among competitors who collectively
lack market power (e.g., two small wheat farmers) is per se illegal, even though it could not
occasion anticompetitive harm. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
224 n.59 (1940). One should not infer from the Court's blanket prohibition, which aims to
minimize decision costs, that the Court deems every instance of horizontal price fixing to
cause anticompetitive harm. For a general discussion of how courts craft antitrust liability
rules in light of decision and error costs, see Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the
Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. L. REv. 871 (2011) (setting forth the decision-theoretic model of
antitrust jurisprudence and demonstrating the Roberts Court's adherence to it).94 Accord Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 n.25 (1984) ("The
rationale for per se rules in part is to avoid a burdensome inquiry into actual market
conditions in situations where the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct is so great as to
render unjustified the costs of determining whether the particular case at bar involves
anticompetitive conduct.").
95 Requiring a showing of tied market foreclosure would likely reduce error costs
(specifically, the overdeterrence occasioned by false positives) by far more than any increase
in decision costs.
96 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 422-26.
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arrangements is based."'97 The dissenters first pointed to tying's ability to "work
significant restraints on competition in the tied product" by foreclosing
competitors from the tied product market and by raising barriers to entry in that
market.98 They then observed that tying may have additional effects. Elhauge
selectively quotes from the dissent, mentioning two of the effects noted:
"'[T]ying arrangements may be used... as a counting device to effect price
discrimination; and they may be used to force a full line of products on the
customer so as to extract more easily from him a monopoly return on one
unique product in the line."' 99 He infers from this mention of tying's potential
price-discrimination and surplus-extraction effects that the dissenting justices
deemed these effects to be anticompetitive. 10
0
A more complete examination of the White-Harlan dissent suggests such an
inference is unwarranted. In quoting from the Fortner I dissent, Elhauge
excludes one of the effects the dissenting justices recognized. Replacing
Elhauge's ellipsis with the omitted text, the White-Harlan dissent reads as
follows:
In addition to these anticompetitive effects in the tied product [i.e., those
related to foreclosure from, and the creation of entry barriers into, the tied
product market], tying arrangements may be used to evade price control in the
tying product through clandestine transfer of the profit to the tied product;
they may be used as a counting device to effect price discrimination; and they
may be used to force a full line of products on the customer so as to extract
more easily from him a monopoly return on one unique product in the line. 101
9 7Fortner 1, 394 U.S. 495, 512 (1969) (White, J., dissenting).98 Id. at 513. The dissent explained:
The tying seller may be working toward a monopoly position in the tied product and,
even if he is not, the practice of tying forecloses other sellers of the tied product and
makes it more difficult for new firms to enter that market. They must be prepared not
only to match existing sellers of the tied product in price and quality, but to offset the
attraction of the tying product itself Even if this is possible through simultaneous entry
into production of the tying product, entry into both markets is significantly more
expensive than simple entry into the tied market, and shifting buying habits in the tied
product is considerably more cumbersome and less responsive to variations in
competitive offers.
Id. (footnote omitted).
99 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 422 (quoting Fortner 1, 394 U.S. at 513-14 (White, J.,
dissenting) (footnotes omitted)).
1001d. (observing that the dissent's reference to metering price discrimination and
consumer surplus extraction "ma[de] clear that the dissent ... believed that discrimination
and extraction created anticompetitive effects separate from any anticompetitive effects in
the tied market").
101Fortner 1, 394 U.S. at 513-14 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
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This is a significant omission. If, as Elhauge suggests, the dissenting
justices had meant that the additional effects they noted are anticompetitive
effects, then they would have been implying that evasion of price controls is
anticompetitive. But quite often-e.g., any time price controls are implemented
for reasons other than to constrain a seller's exercise of market power--evasion
of price controls is actually output-enhancing and thus pro- not anti-
competitive.10 2 The inclusion of a frequently procompetitive effect on the list of
nonforeclosure effects of tying suggests that the dissenting justices did not mean
to imply that the listed effects should be deemed anticompetitive.
Of course, this passage from Fortner I occurred in dissent and is thus, by
itself, of little persuasive value. But Elhauge also cites two majority Supreme
Court opinions-Jefferson Parish and Independent Ink-in support of his claim
that the Court deems tying's price-discrimination effects to be
anticompetitive. 10 3 In Jefferson Parish, the Court favorably quoted the
aforementioned passage from Justice White's Fortner I dissent'0 4 and cited that
dissent in observing that tying "can increase the social costs of market power by
facilitating price discrimination, thereby increasing monopoly profits over what
they would be absent the tie." 10 5 The Court also cited the Bowman, Burstein,
and Stigler articles that purport to demonstrate (respectively) how tying
achieves intraproduct price discrimination, extracts individual consumer
surplus, and facilitates interproduct price discrimination. 10 6 Elhauge thus
concludes that the Jefferson Parish Court deemed these various nonforeclosure
effects of tying to be anticompetitive. 107
Elhauge ignores, though, a passage in which the Jefferson Parish Court
more directly addressed the preconditions to anticompetitive harm from tying
102 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Class Actions, 36 VAND. L. REV.
213, 234 (1983) ("Tying arrangements in price-regulated industries may be efficiency
creating."); Thomas B. Leary, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Law as a Balancing
Act Address (Dec. 17, 1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/leary991
217.shtm (discussing the use of tie-ins to evade price regulation and observing that "[w]hile
regulatory evasion [via tying] may supply the motive for particular conduct that may be
otherwise inexplicable, it does not constitute independent evidence of competitive harm").103 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 422-25 (discussing majority opinions in Jefferson Parish
Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), and Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v.
Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006)). Elhauge also discusses the dissenting opinion of
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas, in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Servicese, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), noting that even these "relatively
conservative Justices" approvingly quoted the Fortner I dissent. Elhauge, supra note 9, at
424. Once again, Elhauge omits from the Kodak dissenters' quotation the part of the Fortner
I dissent referring to the use of tying "to evade price control in the tying product through
clandestine transfer of the profit to the tied product." Fortner 1, 394 U.S. at 513 (White, J.,
dissenting); see also supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
104 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13 n. 19.
105Id. at 14-15 (citation omitted).
1061d. at 15 n.23 (citing Bowman, supra note 25; Burstein, Full-Line Forcing, supra
note 53; Stigler, supra note 44).107 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 423.
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and clarified unequivocally that tied market foreclosure is, in fact, such a
prerequisite. After cataloguing the various effects of tying arrangements
(including, as Elhauge emphasizes, tying's potential to facilitate price
discrimination and thereby enhance the tying monopolist's profits), the Court
turned to the conditions under which tying may create anticompetitive
consequences that justify per se condemnation, and it emphasized two situations
in which such anticompetitive harm would not occur:
[A]pplication of the per se rule focuses on the probability of anticompetitive
consequences.... If only a single purchaser were "forced" with respect to the
purchase of a tied item, the resultant impact on competition would not be
sufficient to warrant the concern of antitrust law. It is for this reason that we
have refused to condemn tying arrangements unless a substantial volume of
commerce is foreclosed thereby. Similarly, when a purchaser is "forced" to
buy a product he would not have otherwise bought even from another seller in
the tied-product market, there can be no adverse impact on competition
because no portion of the market which would otherwise have been available
to other sellers has been foreclosed.
Once this threshold is surmounted, per se prohibition is appropriate if
anticompetitive forcing is likely.10 8
This passage makes clear that, in the Supreme Court's view, tied market
foreclosure is necessary for anticompetitive consequences to result from tying.
If, as Elhauge contends, price discrimination or the extraction of additional
consumer surplus constituted an anticompetitive harm that could justify
prohibiting tying under the antitrust laws, then both scenarios in the quoted
passage would give rise to antitrust liability. It would be entirely possible for a
monopolist to price discriminate against, and extract additional surplus from, a
single high-value consumer by requiring that consumer to purchase a tied
product in order to obtain the monopolist's tying product. Similarly, a
monopolist could price discriminate or extract additional consumer surplus by
imposing a tie-in that forced a purchaser to buy a tied product he would not
have purchased from another seller in the tied product market. Neither scenario,
however, would likely generate significant foreclosure in the tied market. In
insisting (1) that a single-customer tie-in would not impact competition
sufficiently "to warrant the concern of antitrust law" and (2) that a tie-in
involving a tied product the customer would not otherwise have bought would
have "no adverse impact on competition because no portion of the market
which would otherwise have been available to other sellers has been
foreclosed,"' 0 9 the Court made clear that price discrimination and surplus
extraction are not anticompetitive effects of tying and that market foreclosure is
a prerequisite to anticompetitive harm.
108 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15-16 (citations omitted).
1091d. at 16.
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The Supreme Court's most recent tying decision removed any doubt about
that proposition. In Independent Ink, the Court ruled that a tying defendant's
possession of a patent on its tying product is not, in itself, sufficient to establish
that the defendant possessed market power in the tying product market. 110 The
defendant, a printer manufacturer, had required purchasers of its printers to use
its ink exclusively. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had concluded
that the defendant's possession of a patent on its printhead technology
established its market power in the printer market. 111 The Supreme Court
reversed on that point and returned the case to the district court so that the
plaintiff could have an opportunity to define the relevant tying product market
and prove the defendant's possession of power within it.112 Elhauge contends
that the Court's remand instruction "confirm[s] that power effects suffice" to
establish anticompetitive harm.113 Had the Court believed that tied market
foreclosure is a necessary prerequisite to anticompetitive harm, Elhauge asserts,
its remand instruction "would have required evidence of a substantial tied
foreclosure share, which would have been implausible because the ink used for
one specialized sort of printer is hardly likely to be a big share of all ink.""' 14
Elhauge's reading of Independent Ink is unpersuasive for two reasons. As an
initial matter, the Supreme Court's focused remand instruction was dictated by
the narrow legal issue before the Court. The Independent Ink Court granted
certiorari on a precise question-whether a tying defendant's possession of a
patent on the tying product should give rise to a presumption of market power in
the tying product marketl 15-and the briefing and arguments of the parties
therefore focused exclusively on that question." 6 It would have been improvident
110111. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45-46 (2006).
111Indep. Ink, Inc. v. 11. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1 12 1ndep. Ink, 547 U.S. at 46.
1 13 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 425.
1 14 1d.
115 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. 28 (No. 04-1329), 2005
WL 779574, at *I (construing question on appeal as "[w]hether, in an action under Section 1
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, alleging that the defendant engaged in unlawful tying by
conditioning a patent license on the licensee's purchase of a non-patented good, the plaintiff
must prove as part of its affirmative case that the defendant possessed market power in the
relevant market for the tying product, or market power instead is presumed based solely on
the existence of the patent on the tying product").
116 Both the defendant-petitioner and the plaintiff-respondent construed the issue before
the Court as limited to the narrow question:
Whether, in an action under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, alleging that
the defendant engaged in unlawful tying by conditioning a patent license on the
licensee's purchase of a non-patented good, the plaintiff must prove as part of its
affirmative case that the defendant possessed market power in the relevant market for
the tying product, or whether market power instead is presumed based solely on the
existence of a patent on the invention embodied in the tying product.
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for the Court to address the broader issue of whether substantial tied market
foreclosure should be required for tying liability when the petitioner had not
sought review of the question and neither the parties nor amici had briefed the
issue. 1 17 Accordingly, the Court addressed only the narrow question at hand and
crafted its remand instruction to reflect only its resolution of that discrete matter.
Moreover, while the Independent Ink Court was not presented with the
question of whether substantial tied market foreclosure should be a prerequisite
to tying liability, it did consider--and rejected-the argument that requirements
ties resulting in price discrimination and extraction of consumer surplus should
be condemned as anticompetitive. 118 In seeking to sustain the judgment in its
favor, the plaintiff-respondent presented the Court with a narrower alternative to
its requested holding that possession of a patent creates a presumption of market
power. That narrower alternative would have created a presumption of tying
market power when a defendant with a patent on its tying product imposes a
"requirements tie" on purchasers of that product, mandating that they also
purchase their requirements of unpatented complements from the defendant.19
As professors Barry Nalebuff, Ian Ayres, and Lawrence Sullivan explained in
an amicus brief advocating this narrower holding, the presumption of tying
market power in cases involving patented tying products and requirements ties
would enable antitrust to police the use of tie-ins to price discriminate and
extract additional consumer surplus by metering consumer demand for the tying
product. 120  Nalebuff, Ayres, and Sullivan contended that such price
discrimination and surplus extraction are anticompetitive effects that are
properly addressed by antitrust.121
The Supreme Court was unpersuaded. While the Court acknowledged that
metering tie-ins may result in price discrimination (and even referenced the
Jefferson Parish footnote citing the Bowman, Burstein, and Stigler articles), 122 it
rejected the narrower holding advocated by the amici professors because it
concluded that price discrimination "occurs in fully competitive markets" and that
"[m]any tying arrangements, even those involving patents and requirements ties,
Brief for the Petitioners at I, Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. 28 (No. 04-1329), 2005 WL 1864122,
at *I; Brief for Respondent at i, Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. 28 (No. 04-1329), 2005 WL 2427645,
at *i.
l17Accord Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761-62 n.7 (1986)
(declining to abrogate per se rule against minimum RPM, despite misgivings about the rule,
because issue had not been properly appealed or briefed).118 See Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. at 44-45.
119 Id. at 43-44.
120 See Brief of Professors Barry Nalebuff, Ian Ayres, and Lawrence Sullivan as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4, Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. 28 (No. 04-1329), 2005 WL
2427646, at *4.
121 Id. at 18-27 ("The Use of Tying as a Metering Device Implicates Serious Antitrust
Concerns.").
122 Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. at 44 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 15 n.23 (1984)).
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are fully consistent with a free, competitive market."'123 The Court thus made
clear that, while it understands that price discrimination and additional surplus
extraction are possible effects of tying, they are not appropriately deemed
anticompetitive effects that justify condemnation under the antitrust laws. Elhauge
is thus wrong in concluding that governing Supreme Court precedent deems the
nonforeclosure (power) effects of tying to be anticompetitive.
B. Price Discrimination Induced by Tying Should Not Be Deemed
Anticompetitive and Is Inappropriately Condemned Under Governing
Liability Rules.
In addition to his descriptive claim that Supreme Court precedent deems
tying's price-discrimination effects to be anticompetitive, Elhauge asserts the
normative claim that those effects should be deemed anticompetitive. He
contends that tying-induced price discrimination reduces consumer welfare and
has, at best, ambiguous effects on total welfare. 124 He rejects the view that
competition is furthered by a policy permitting monopolists to extract higher
profits through tying that does not induce significant tied market foreclosure. 125
And he insists that the few tie-ins that do enhance total welfare would pass
muster under the currently prevailing liability rule, which includes an
efficiencies defense. 126 He is wrong on all these points.
1. The Tying-Induced Price Discrimination Observed in Actual Practice
Generally Enhances Static Efficiency.
Elhauge's discussion of the static (or, in his words, ex post) welfare effects
of tying-induced price discrimination focuses primarily on tying aimed at
metering consumer demand. He purports to show that the price discrimination
facilitated by such tying generally reduces total welfare. 127 He says little about
the efficiency effects of tying that induces Stigler-type (interproduct) price
discrimination. 128 In reality, both forms of tying-induced price discrimination,
as actually implemented in the real world as opposed to the economist's
textbook, typically enhance total welfare.
123Id. at 45.
124 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 426-35.
125Id. at 439-42.
1261d. at 401 ("[T]he quasi-per se rule.. . does not condemn ties if the defendant proves
an offsetting efficiency."); id. at 427 ("To the extent ties empirically have efficiencies that
offset adverse power effects, the quasi-per se rule allows defendants to prove them."); id. at
430 ("Because the quasi-per se rule prohibits ties only when a defendant with market power
cannot prove an offsetting efficiency, it will condemn ties that achieve intraproduct price
discrimination only when efficiencies fail to offset adverse power effects.").
12 7 Id. at 430-34.
1281d. at 434-35.
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a. Price Discrimination via Metering Tie-Ins
Elhauge's claim that metering tie-ins typically reduce welfare is premised
on two assumptions: that metering tie-ins are a form of third-degree price
discrimination and that they often fail to enhance output by bringing new
consumer groups into the market. Both assumptions are unwarranted. In
actuality, metering tie-ins constitute a form of second-degree price
discrimination, which typically enhances consumer welfare and may do so even
if it does not occasion an increase in output. Moreover, even if one shoehorns
metering tie-ins into the category of third-degree price discrimination, as
Elhauge does, the sort of tie-ins observed in practice typically bring new
consumers into the market and thereby expand output and total welfare.
Following the lead of economist A.C. Pigou, scholars have traditionally
categorized price discrimination schemes into three types.129 First-degree price
discrimination is "perfect" price discrimination, 130 in which each consumer is
charged her particular reservation price. 131 Such price discrimination maximizes
market efficiency, for each unit that is valued by a consumer at an amount
exceeding its cost is produced, and deadweight loss is eliminated (though all
surplus goes to the producer). 132 Because it is impossible for sellers to know
buyers' reservation prices, first-degree price discrimination does not exist in
reality.
Second-degree price discrimination occurs when a seller charges different
prices to different consumers but does so pursuant to a single price schedule that
enables consumers to select the applicable price through their particular
consumption patterns. 133 For example, a price schedule incorporating quantity
discounts allows any consumer to opt for lower per-unit prices by achieving
certain purchase targets. Similarly, a fare schedule offering different prices for
first- and second-class travel enables different consumers to choose different
prices. 134
129 See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 278-79 (4th ed. 1932).
130 See, e.g., Klein & Wiley, supra note 31, at 612.
131 A reservation price is the subjective value a consumer ascribes to, and is thus willing
to pay for, a product. If she pays her reservation price, a consumer receives no surplus from
a purchase. Any price below the reservation price creates some consumer surplus. At a price
above the reservation price, the consumer would not voluntarily purchase the product at
issue.132 See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 932; Klein & Wiley, supra note
31, at 612-13 (observing that with perfect price discrimination, "the seller would increase
output to the efficient point where price equals marginal cost"); supra note 131.
133 See PIGOU, supra note 129, at 279; Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at
934.134 While different classes of travel involve different amenities, a class-based fare
schedule is still discriminatory in that the different fares involve different ratios of price to
marginal cost-i.e., the seller mark-up is greater on first-class. See Hovenkamp &
Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 938 (observing that as a technical matter, price discrimination
involves "sales at differing ratios of price to marginal cost").
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Third-degree price discrimination occurs when a seller divides consumers
into groups and charges the various groups different prices based on the seller's
estimate of group members' reservation prices. 135 Many movie theaters, for
example, offer discounts to children, students, and senior citizens on the theory
that such individuals are unwilling to pay as much as nonstudent (and thus
presumably employed) adults. Whereas a second-degree price discrimination
scheme allows consumers to select the price they pay by altering their
consumption patterns, consumers subject to third-degree price discrimination
cannot change their price without altering their status (e.g., an eighteen-year-old
movie patron could obtain a student discount by enrolling in school, but not by
purchasing more, fewer, or different movie tickets).
Elhauge maintains that metering tie-ins amount to third-degree price
discrimination that tends to reduce total welfare. 136 Third-degree price
discrimination is "imperfect," Elhauge correctly observes, 137  because
membership in a customer group (e.g., senior citizens) is merely a proxy for
willingness to pay for the product at issue, 138 and within any group of buyers,
there will be a range of reservation prices. 139 Given that group members differ in
their willingness to pay, each purchaser category in a third-degree price
discrimination scheme will exhibit a downward-sloping demand curve (indicative
of the fact that more customers within the group will buy the product, and more
units will be sold, as the price is reduced). Accordingly, a monopolist engaged in
third-degree price discrimination will consider each group's demand function and
will seek to set each group's price at the level that maximizes the monopolist's
profits on sales to that group. At that group-specific price, some low-valuation
members will be priced out of the market even though their willingness to pay
exceeds the seller's costs. Thus, the pricing for each particular customer group
will be monopolistic and will involve some deadweight loss. Assuming linear
demand, the discriminatory pricing scheme will not change the monopolist's
profit-maximizing output unless the price discrimination generates purchases by a
category of buyers who would buy none of the product at a uniform monopoly
price but will do so at a discriminatory price. The discrimination will also tend to
reallocate output from high-value buyers (who face higher prices because of the
discriminatory pricing and will therefore purchase less) to low-value buyers (who
face lower prices and will therefore purchase more). 140 Taken together, these two
135 See PIGou, supra note 129, at 279; Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at
933.
136 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 431.
137 See id.
138 For example, while many senior citizens live on a fixed income and are particularly
price-sensitive, some seniors may be willing to pay much more than the average moviegoer
for a movie ticket. Senior status is imperfectly correlated with a lower reservation price.
139For example, even if all senior citizens valued movie tickets less than the average
moviegoer, some seniors would value the tickets more than other seniors.
140 Suppose, for example, that the seller's profit-maximizing price for the group of high-
valuation "disfavored" consumers is $8, and the profit-maximizing price for the low-
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features of third-degree price discrimination-no change in output, but a
redistribution from high- to low-value consumers-will reduce total welfare. 14 1
According to Elhauge, metering tie-ins are a form of third-degree price
discrimination.142 Illustrating the welfare effects of such a pricing scheme with a
stylized example involving printers and ink cartridges, Elhauge purports to show
that the price discrimination inherent in a metering tie-in will tend to reduce total
welfare. 143 Below, I show that metering tie-ins are likely welfare-enhancing even
if conceived of as instances of third-degree price discrimination. 144 A more
significant flaw in Elhauge's analysis, though, is that he miscategorizes metering
tie-ins as third-degree price discrimination when they really involve second-
degree price discrimination. That mischaracterization has important implications,
for instances of second- and third-degree price discrimination have quite different
welfare effects.
i. Metering Tie-Ins Are Really a Form of Welfare-Enhancing, Second-
Degree Price Discrimination.
Central to the welfare analysis of third-degree price discrimination
(particularly to the conclusion that such discrimination reduces total welfare
unless it occasions an increase in output) is the inability of consumers to switch
among pricing groups when the seller's discriminatory scheme "misfires."
Consider, for example, a movie theater owner who, reasoning that non-student
adults typically have higher reservation prices for movies than do students,
charges $10 for an adult ticket and $7 for a student ticket. Those prices are the
respective profit-maximizing prices for all adults and all students in the locality.
Suppose, though, that an unemployed adult would pay only $9.75 to see the
movie. She would not be able to do so, even though a student who values
admission at only $7.25 would be admitted. Because the adult could not alter
her consumption in any way so as to avail herself of the $7 student price, the
price discrimination scheme would allocate theater seats in a wealth-destructive
fashion (i.e., from a patron who values the seat at $9.75 to one who values it at
only $7.25).145 Accordingly, if we assume linear demand among adults and
valuation "favored" consumers is $5. A disfavored consumer valuing the product at $7.90
would not receive the product, whereas a favored consumer valuing it at $5.10 would receive
it. Distributing the unit to the favored consumer instead of the disfavored one reduces
consumer surplus by $2.80. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 934.
141 See Elhauge, supra note 9, at 431-32.
142 Id. at 431 (observing that metering tie-ins involve "categorizing tying product buyers
into different groups (based on their number of tied product purchases) and charging each
group a different effective price for the same tying product (by inflating tied product
prices)").
143 Id. at 432-33.
144 See infra Part III.B. l.a.ii.
145 The fact that this price discrimination scheme fails to satisfy the demand of a
"higher-valuing" consumer in favor of a "lower-valuing" one is what renders this scheme a
third-degree price discrimination scheme. As Pigou explained, "This degree [third], it will be
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students, the price discrimination scheme here could not enhance total welfare
unless it increased the total number of tickets sold.
In contrast to a third-degree price discrimination scheme in which
individual consumers find themselves locked into groups and denied pricing
offered to others, simple metering tie-ins offer every consumer the same prices
for the tying and tied products. 146 In general, the price of the tying (monopoly)
product is reduced from the profit-maximizing level, and the price of the tied
(competitive) product is increased above competitive levels. 147 For example, a
photocopier monopolist might lower its copier price from the profit-maximizing
level of $400 to $200 but then require buyers to purchase its brand of paper at
$0.04 per page rather than the competitive price of $0.02 per page. The effect of
this sort of pricing is merely to convert some portion of the consumer's fixed
costs (the copier payment) to variable costs (payments for paper). 148 But the
fact that the exact same pricing scheme applies to all consumers ensures that at
the margin, all consumers receive the same valuation.149 Here, for example, the
last copy purchased by the consumers who most value photocopies will create
value of $0.04 for the ultimate purchaser, and the last copy purchased by
consumers who least value photocopies will create value of $0.04 for the
ultimate purchaser. Unlike the movie theater scenario, in which the marginal
student consumer valued his seat right at $7 and the marginal non-student adult
valued hers at $10 (and would not have obtained a seat at all, even from the
student valuing the seat at only $7, had her valuation dipped slightly below
$10), the price discrimination inherent in a metering tie-in involves no transfer
of surplus from high-value to low-value buyers. Accordingly, second-degree
price discrimination in the form of metering, unlike a third-degree price
discrimination scheme, need not increase total output in order to enhance
welfare. 150
Because second-degree price discrimination in the form of metering typically
involves two effects-a reduction in fixed costs (a cheaper tying product) coupled
noticed, differs fundamentally from either of the preceding degrees, in that it may involve
the refusal to satisfy, in one market, demands represented by demand prices in excess of
some of those which, in another market, are satisfied." PIGOU, supra note 129, at 279.
146The term "simple" metering tie-ins excludes metering tie-ins that are accompanied
by some other price discrimination scheme, such as different rates for different categories of
users. For example, a printer manufacturer might not only tie its machine and its ink (a form
of second-degree price discrimination) but also charge different machine and ink prices to
commercial versus household consumers. The latter aspect of this arrangement constitutes
third-degree price discrimination. The welfare analysis discussed in the text following this
note applies to pure second-degree price discrimination.
147 See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 942 n.77 (cataloguing litigated
cases exhibiting the pricing pattern described).
148Id. at 941 ("The principal effect of tying in the printer-cartridge story (or numerous
similar stories in the litigated cases) is that consumers' cost structure changes by making a
larger portion of their costs variable rather than fixed.").
14 9 1d. at 937-38.
1501d. at 938, 951-52.
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with an increase in variable costs (more expensive tied complements)--it will
have different welfare effects for consumers who use the tying product at
different rates. 151 Low-intensity users, those who use the tying product so little
that they would not buy it at the single-product monopoly price but will do so
under a tie-in that reduces the tying and increases the tied price, unambiguously
benefit from metering tie-ins; any surplus they receive from purchasing the tie-in
is consumer surplus that would not exist absent tying.152 Medium-intensity users,
those who previously bought enough of the tied complement to justify paying the
monopoly price for the tying product (so that they are not brought into the market
by the tie-in) but who do not purchase so many tied units that their increased
outlays on tied products exceed the price-break they enjoy on the tying product,
also benefit from the tie-in; their increased expenditures on tied products are more
than offset by the reduced cost of the tying product.153 High-intensity users, those
who purchase so many tied product units that their increase in outlays for the tied
product exceeds the price break they enjoy on the tying product, suffer a loss of
consumer surplus. 154 The seller, in turn, benefits from low-intensity buyers (who
otherwise would make no purchases) and from high-intensity buyers (who pay
more under tying than in its absence) but loses money on medium-intensity
consumers, whose price break on the tying product is not offset by higher tied
product expenditures. 155 Whether any particular metering tie-in will enhance
consumer and total welfare therefore depends on the relative concentration of
low-, medium-, and high-intensity users.
Importantly, second-degree price discrimination via metering may
increase consumer surplus even if it does not occasion an increase in total
market output. If there are few low-intensity consumers (those brought into
the market by the tie-in), then an increase in the tied product price may cause
medium- and high-intensity users to cut back their purchases by more than the
amount of new purchases by low-intensity users. Nevertheless, consumer
surplus will increase if the sum of cost-savings to medium-intensity users and
surplus to new low-intensity purchasers exceeds the cost increases to high-
intensity purchasers. 156 In other words, metering price discrimination, unlike
third-degree price discrimination, may enhance consumer surplus even if total
market output contracts.
Because the relative concentration of low-, medium-, and high-intensity
users is difficult to determine, it is hard to assess (either before or after the
fact) the consumer welfare effects of any particular instance of metering price
discrimination. 157 There are good reasons to suppose, though, that most
instances of metering enhance consumer welfare. First, as the foregoing
151Id. at 943-52.
152 Id. at 944.
153 Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 944.
154Id.
155 Id
156Id. at 949-50.
157Id. at 950.
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analysis indicates, the only context in which one would expect negative
consumer welfare effects from the type of metering tie-in observed in practice
(i.e., one involving a reduction in the price of the tying product and a smaller
increase in the price of the tied product) 158 is when sales are concentrated
among high-intensity consumers. When low-intensity users dominate, one
would expect metering to enhance both market output and consumer welfare;
when medium-intensity users dominate, one would expect a consumer welfare
increase, though total market output might drop.
Moreover, all this analysis has assumed is that the tie-in occasions no other
productive or allocative efficiency. In actuality, tie-ins frequently create
efficiencies that ultimately benefit consumers. In terms of productive efficiencies,
a tie-in may permit the seller to increase output of the tying product (as more low-
intensity consumers purchase that product in response to its reduced price) and
thereby achieve economies of scale. 159 The seller may also achieve economies of
scope through joint packaging or distribution of the tying and tied products. 160
Some portion of any tying-induced scale or scope efficiencies will likely be
passed on to consumers. In addition, consumers will frequently benefit from
tying-induced allocative efficiencies. For example, when a seller with market
power sells a product whose complement is also sold in a non-competitive
market, both that seller and the seller of the complement are likely to charge
supracompetitive prices, with each assuming competitive (or "less
supracompetitive") pricing by the other. The seller may eliminate this double
marginalization, enhance its own profits, and reduce consumer prices by
producing the complementary product or service and tying it to its own
product. 161 In addition, metering tie-ins may make downstream markets more
158 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
159 See supra note 58 and accompanying text; see also 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 3, 1716-17, at 154-206.
1609 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1716-17, at 154-206; Hovenkamp &
Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 950, 965.
161 Hovenkamp and Hovenkamp offer the following example of a welfare-enhancing tie-
in aimed at the elimination of double marginalization:
[S]uppose that most authors prefer to have both a dictionary and a thesaurus, and both
are sold in an imperfectly competitive market, such as an oligopoly. A dictionary costs
$10 to make, a thesaurus costs $8 to make, and the profit-maximizing price of a bundle
is $20. Different firms selling the two products would each try to capture the
overcharge. For example, the dictionary maker might charge $12 on the theory that the
thesaurus maker would charge $8. But the thesaurus maker would charge $10 on the
assumption that the dictionary maker would charge $10 as well. That outcome, which
would yield a package price of $22, is suboptimal for everyone. Fewer consumers
would buy and those who did would pay too much. Output for both the dictionary
maker and the thesaurus maker would fall below the profit-maximizing level. In this
case, consumer welfare would increase if a single firm sold both the dictionary and the
thesaurus for a package price of $20, which would also be that firm's profit-maximizing
level.
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competitive by making it possible for smaller (lower-intensity) buyers to enter the
market. 162
The foregoing list of productive and allocative efficiencies is far from
exhaustive, and an in-depth consideration of such efficiencies is beyond the
scope of this Article. For present purposes, though, it will suffice to observe that
tie-ins frequently create efficiencies from which consumers benefit. Because
metering tie-ins appear unlikely to reduce consumer welfare even in the absence
of such cost savings, the case for condemning them absent foreclosure effects
becomes weak indeed once tying-induced efficiencies are considered.
ii. Even if Conceived of as Third-Degree Price Discrimination, Metering
Tie-Ins Typically Enhance Welfare.
Elhauge contends that metering tie-ins are a form of third-degree price
discrimination because they involve "categorizing tying product buyers into
different groups (based on their number of tied product purchases) and charging
each group a different effective price for the same tying product (by inflating tied
product prices)."' 163 For the reasons just stated, this appears to be a
mischaracterization. 164 Nevertheless, even if one conceives of metering tie-ins as
instances of third-degree price discrimination, they are likely welfare enhancing.
Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 959. As the authors observe, some sort of
tying or bundled discounting is a key part of this sort of pricing scheme, for a seller would
be unlikely to sell the complement at cost absent a tie-in or other incentive to purchase both
products together:
One might assume that the dictionary maker could charge $12 for the dictionary and
separately sell the thesaurus at the marginal cost price of $8. But this result would be no
better than bundling, and the seller could not be expected to do it, because some buyers
would purchase its thesaurus at the competitive price and then go elsewhere for their
$12 dictionary.
Id. at 960.
162 Again, consider an example offered by Hovenkamp and Hovenkamp:
[A] gasoline refiner may contemplate franchising gasoline stations into a particular
community. The cost of building a station, coupled with a reasonable return on
intellectual property rights, might well amount to a million dollars, and the franchisor
might have difficulty finding potential franchisees willing to make that investment. As
an alternative, however, it might finance a large portion of the fixed-cost investment
itself, charging the franchisees a sum sufficient to guarantee their commitment. It would
then make up the rest by tying gasoline and charging a few cents more per gallon than
the wholesale price. The result could be many more franchisees in the community that
behave more competitively vis-A-vis one another and sell more gasoline overall.
Id. at 965.16 3 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 431.
164 See supra notes 129-50 and accompanying text.
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To demonstrate why this is so, I first set forth Elhauge's own highly stylized
example and then compare it with more realistic instances of metering tie-ins.
Elhauge's example of a metering tie-in involves a printer monopolist who
faces a competitive ink cartridge market.165 Printer customers can be divided into
three classes based on intensity of usage: those who would, at competitive
cartridge prices, use one, two, or three ink cartridges. Each of those customer
groups contains 200 members, whose valuations of one cartridge's worth of
printing range linearly from $0 to $199. To simplify the math, Elhauge assumes
that printers and cartridges cost $0 to make. With cartridges priced at the
competitive price of $0, consumers attribute the entire cost of printing to the
printer itself.166 Accordingly, the three groups' respective demand functions for
printing (and, because cartridges are priced at $0, for the monopolist's printer) are
200 - Pp, 200 - Pp/2, and 200 - Pp13 , where Pp is the printer price.' 67 Figure 1
represents the printer demand curves for the three groups.
Figure 1: Demand Functions of the One-, Two-, and Three-
Cartridge Groups
600
Q = 200 - Pp3
400 (The three-cartridge group)
Q = 200 - P12
(The two-cartridge group)
200
e Q = 200 - P
(The one-cartridge group)
200
Aggregating the three groups' demand functions would yield a "kinked"
demand curve where Q = 600 - (11/6)Pp from prices $0 to $200, Q = 400 -
165 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 432-33.
166 For example, if the printer is priced at $300, consumers who would use three
cartridges at a price of $0 view the price of a cartridge's worth of printing as $100; members
of the two-cartridge group view the effective per-cartridge price as $150; and members of
the one-cartridge group view the per-cartridge printing price as $300.
167 For the one-cartridge group, 200 printers would be purchased at a price of $0, and 0
printers would be purchased at a price of $200, so (given that demand is linear among the
200 members of the group), Q = 200 - P,. For the two-cartridge group, 200 printers would
be purchased at a price of $0, and 0 printers would be purchased at a price of $400, so Q =
200 - P/2. For the three-cartridge group, 200 printers would be purchased at a price of $0,
and 0 printers would be purchased at a price of $600, so Q = P,3.
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(5/6)Pp from prices $201 to $400, and Q = 200 - Pp/3 from prices $401 to
$600.168 Given that demand function, if the cost of producing a printer is $0,
the monopolist's profit-maximizing uniform printer price would be
$163.64.169 At that price, printer output would be 300,170 cartridge output
would be 709,171 profits would be $49,090,172 total consumer surplus would
be $46,362,173 and total welfare would be $95,452.174 Figure 2 illustrates the
168 Members of the one-cartridge group reduce their printer purchases to zero when the
printer price reaches $200. Members of the two-cartridge group will continue to make
purchases until the printer prices reaches near $400 but will make no purchases beyond that
point. Purchases among members of the three-cartridge group will continue as price exceeds
$400, but no purchases will occur above $600. Accordingly, from prices of $400 to $600,
the demand function is simply that of the three-cartridge group, Q = 200 - P,13. From prices
of $200 to $400, the two-cartridge group's demand function (200 - P,2) must be added in,
so Q = 400 - 5/6(P,). From prices of $0 to $200, the one-cartridge group's demand function
(200- P,) must be added in, so Q = 600 - 11/6(P,).
Elhauge suggests the aggregate demand curve would be linear. Elhauge, supra note 9, at
432 ("[W]e can add the three groups' demand functions to get aggregate printer demand of
600 - (116)Pp."). That is incorrect. For price ranges in which the quantity demanded by a
group would fall to zero (e.g., Pp > $400 for the two-cartridge group, P, > $200 for the one-
cartridge group), that group's demand function cannot be added in.
169 With zero costs, a seller's profits will equal Q * P. Thus, for any demand function Q
SA - BP, profits will equal (A - BP)(P), or AP - BP2. Taking the derivative shows that
these profits are maximized when P = A/2B. With a "kinked" demand curve, the profit-
maximizing price will be the price that would maximize profits on one of the linear
functions. That means that for the kinked aggregate demand curve in Elhauge's printer
hypothetical, the candidates for profit-maximizing price would be $300 (the profit-
maximizing price (Pm) for the demand function Q = 200 - Pp/3 ), $240 (Pm for the demand
function Q = 400 - 5/6(Pp)), or $163.64 (P. for the demand function Q = 600 - 11/6(Pp)). At
a price of $300, members of the one-cartridge group (whose demand function is 200 - Pp)
would purchase 0 printers; members of the two-cartridge group (whose demand function is
200 - Pp12) would purchase 50 printers; and members of the three-cartridge group (whose
demand function is 200 - Pp/3) would purchase 100 printers. Total profits would be $45,000
($300 * 150). At a price of $240, members of the one-, two-, and three-cartridge groups
would purchase 0, 80, and 120 printers, respectively, so profits would equal $48,000. At a
price of $163.64, members of the one-, two-, and three-cartridge groups would purchase 36
(36.36), 118 (118.18), and 145 (145.45) printers, respectively, so profits would equal
$48,928.36 (or $49,090.36, if fractional purchases were possible). Thus, $163.64 is the
profit-maximizing price for this aggregate demand function.
170 Printer output is derived by plugging the printer price into each group's demand
function. At the profit-maximizing uniform price, the one-, two-, and three-cartridge groups
would purchase 36.36, 118.18, and 145.45 printers, respectively. See supra note 169. Total
printer purchases would equal 299.99.
171 Cartridge output is derived by multiplying the number of each group's printers by the
number of cartridges members will consume per printer. The one-cartridge group would
purchase 36.36 cartridges (36.36 * 1); the two-cartridge group, 236.36 (118.18 * 2); the
three-cartridge group, 436.35 (145.45 * 3). Total cartridge purchases would equal 709.07.172 The seller would earn revenue of $49,090.36 (299.99 * $163.64). Given the zero-cost
assumption, all this revenue is profit for the seller.
173 On a demand curve, consumer surplus is graphically represented by the area above
the price charged and below the demand curve. For example, for the one-cartridge group,
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aggregate demand curve of the three groups and notes output and price when
printer cost is $0 and the printer monopolist engages in uniform
(nondiscriminatory) pricing.
Figure 2: Aggregate Demand for Monopolist's Printer; Output
and Surplus with Uniform Pricing
600
500
400
300
200
P,,, = $163.64
100
100 200 300
(Q,n)
400 500 600
Elhauge then compares what would happen if the printer monopolist were
to engage in metering price discrimination. In that case, the monopolist would
determine the profit-maximizing price for each consumer group and would
seek to charge each group that price. It would thus seek to charge one-
whose demand function Q = 200 - P, extends linearly from 200 on the y axis to 200 on the x
axis, see supra Figure 1, consumer surplus would be represented by a right triangle whose
height is 36.36 (the difference between the profit-maximizing price of $163.64 and $200, the
"choke" price at which purchases would fall to zero) and whose base is also 36.36
(representing quantity demanded at the profit-maximizing price). Because the area of a right
triangle is one-half the base times the height, consumer surplus for the one-cartridge group
totals $661.02. For the two-cartridge group, the height of the consumer surplus triangle is
236.36 (representing the difference between the "choke" price of $400 and the profit-
maximizing price of $163.64) and the base is 118.18 (quantity demanded at the profit-
maximizing price), generating consumer surplus of $13,966.51. Consumer surplus for the
three-cartridge group is (436.46 * 145.45)/2, or $31,734.28. Summing the consumer surplus
for the three groups yields the total consumer surplus at the profit-maximizing price,
$46,361.81.
174 Total welfare is the sum of producer and consumer surplus: $49,090 + $46,362 =
$95,452.
[Vol. 72:5
TYING AND BUNDLED DISCOUNTING
cartridge buyers $100,175 two-cartridge buyers $200,176 and three-cartridge
buyers $300.177 It could implement this scheme by charging $0 for the printer
but requiring printer buyers to purchase ink cartridges from it at a
supracompetitive price of $100 per cartridge. If it imposed this scheme (which
would result in effective prices of $100, $200, and $300 for members of the
one-, two-, and three-cartridge groups, respectively), it would still sell 300
printers, 178 but cartridge purchases would drop to 600.179 The seller's profits
would rise by 22% to $60,000.00,180 consumer surplus would fall 35% to
$30,000.00,181 and total welfare would fall almost 6% to $90,000.00. As
Elhauge explains,
The reason for this decline in ex post total welfare (and cartridge output) is
that, although total printer output has remained constant, tying-induced price
discrimination reallocates some printer output from buyers who value printers
from $163.64 to $300 (and use 2-3 cartridges) to buyers who value printers
from $100 to $163.64 (and use 1 cartridge). 182
But the total welfare reduction Elhauge highlights depends on there being
no change in total printer output. If the printer monopolist's price
discrimination generated greater printer output by expanding sales to lower-
valuation consumers who would not purchase the product at the uniform
monopoly price, and if the welfare gains among those new customers
exceeded the welfare losses by high-valuation customers who cut back on
purchases in response to higher effective prices, then the price discrimination
scheme would enhance total welfare. Such output and welfare enhancement
would occur if the monopolist's price discrimination scheme employed a more
refined metering device that segregated the customer base into a larger
number of groups.
175 With zero costs, profits are maximized for any demand function Q = A - BP when P
- A/2B. See supra note 169. Thus, if the demand function is Q = 200 - Pp, then the profit-
maximizing price is $100.
176 When Q = 200 - Pp2, the profit-maximizing price is $200.
177 When Q = 200 - Pp/3, the profit-maximizing price is $300.
178 Facing an effective price of $100, members of the one-cartridge group (Q = 200 - Pp)
would buy 100 printers. Facing an effective price of $200, members of the two-cartridge
group (Q = 200 - Pp1 2) would buy 100 printers. Facing an effective price of $300, members
of the three-cartridge group (Q = 200 - P,13) would buy 100 printers.
179 For their 100 printers, one-cartridge group members would purchase 100 cartridges;
members of the two-cartridge group, 200; and members of the three-cartridge group, 300.
180 600 cartridges * $100 per cartridge - $0 costs.
181 For the one-cartridge group, consumer welfare = (100 * $100)/2 = $5,000. For the
two-cartridge group, consumer welfare = (200 * $100)/2 = $10,000. For the three-cartridge
group, consumer welfare = (300 * $100)/2 = $15,000. Thus, total consumer welfare is
$30,000. For an explanation of how consumer surplus is derived, see supra note 173.
182 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 433.
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Consider, for example, what would happen if demand among purchasers
was such that the printer monopolist's customer base divided more readily
into four, rather than three, groups. The monopolist would then have an
incentive to employ a more refined meter. For example, if each printer
cartridge in Elhauge's original example printed 4,000 pages and the three
consumer groups purchased from one to three cartridges at competitive prices,
the monopolist in this revised example might reduce the size of its printer
cartridge by 25% to a 3,000-page capacity. Whereas the 600 consumers in
Elhauge's example could opt to purchase the ability to print either 1 to 4,000;
4,001 to 8,000; or 8,001 to 12,000 pages, the consumers in this revised
example could purchase printing capacity of either I to 3,000; 3,001 to 6,000;
6,001 to 9,000; or 9,001 to 12,000 pages. Assuming that usage rates at
competitive prices are distributed linearly and that, as in Elhauge's example,
the reservation prices for one cartridge's worth of printing also vary in a linear
fashion, reducing the size of the printer cartridge by 25% would transform
Elhauge's three 200-member groups of consumers into four 150-member
groups, who would, at competitive prices for ink cartridges ($0), consume one
to four cartridges and would value one cartridge's worth of printing from $0
to $149. At competitive ink prices, the printer demand functions for the one-
cartridge to four-cartridge groups would be, respectively: 150 - Pp, 150 -
Pp/2, 150 - Pp/3, and 150 - Pp/4.183 This would generate a kinked, but
"smoother," aggregate demand curve where Q = 600 - (25/12)Pp from prices
$0 to $150, Q = 450 - (13/12)Pp from prices $151 to $300, Q = 300 - (7/12)Pp
from prices $301 to $450, and Q = 150 - (1/4)Pp from prices $451 to $600.184
Assuming printers cost nothing to produce, the uniform profit-maximizing
price for the printer monopolist would be $207.69.185 At that price, the
monopolist would sell 225 printers and 727 cartridges. 186 His profits would be
183 Cf supra note 167 and accompanying text.
184 Cf supra note 168 and accompanying text.
185 Cf supra note 169 and accompanying text. With this kinked aggregate demand
curve, the candidates for profit-maximizing uniform price would be $144 (Pm where Q = 600
- (25/12)Pp); $207.69 (Pm where Q = 450 - (13/12)Pp); $257.14 (P. where Q = 300 -
(7/12)Pp); and $300 (P. where Q = 150 - (114)Pp). Slotting these prices into the demand
functions for the four groups of buyers (i.e., Q = 150 - Pp; Q = 150 - P,/2; Q = 150 - PJ3;
and Q = 150 - Pp14) reveals that at a price of $144, the seller would sell 300 printers for total
profits of $43,200; at a price of $207.69, he would sell 225 printers for profits of $46,730.77;
at a price of $257.14, he would sell 171.44 printers for profits of $44,082.80; and at a price
of $300, he would sell 125 printers for profits of $37,500. Thus, the seller's profits would be
maximized at a uniform price of $207.69.
186 At a price of $207.69, members of the one-cartridge group (Q = 150 -Pp) would buy
0 printers and 0 cartridges. Members of the two-cartridge group (Q = 150 - P12) would buy
46.16 printers and 92.31 cartridges. Members of the three-cartridge group (Q = 150 - P13)
would buy 80.77 printers and 242.31 cartridges. And members of the four-cartridge group
(Q = 150 - Pp/4) would buy 98.08 printers and 392.32 cartridges.
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$46,730,187 and consumer surplus would total $31,155,188 generating total
welfare of $77,885.189 Notably, the consumers whose demand is reflected in
the most elastic portion of the demand curve (i.e., the bold segment farthest to
the right) would purchase zero printers. See Figure 3.
Figure 3: Output and Price with Four Buyer Groups and
Uniform Pricing
600
450
300
$207.69 .
(P.,)
150
150 225 300 450 600(Q,)
Now suppose the monopolist were to engage in the sort of metering price
discrimination utilized in Elhauge's hypothetical. He would seek to charge each
group its profit-maximizing price, which would be $75 for the one-cartridge
group, $150 for the two-cartridge group, $225 for the three-cartridge group, and
$300 for the four-cartridge group. 190 The monopolist could achieve such price
187 The seller's revenues would total 225 * $207.69 = $46,730. Assuming zero costs,
this is all profit.
188 Total consumer surplus is derived by summing the consumer surplus enjoyed by
each of the buyer groups, and each group's consumer surplus equals 1/2(choke price -
Pm)(number of units purchased at Pm). See supra note 173. The one-cartridge group would
purchase no printers and would thus capture no surplus. The two-cartridge group would
purchase 46.16 printers at P,, and the difference between that group's choke price ($300)
and Pm ($207.69) equals $92.31, so that group's consumer surplus would be $2,130.51. The
three-cartridge group would purchase 80.77 printers at Pr, and the difference between that
group's choke price ($450) and P. is $242.31, so consumer surplus would be $9,785.69. The
four-cartridge group would purchase 98.08 printers at P,,, and the difference between that
group's choke price ($600) and Pm is $392.31, so consumer surplus would be $19,238.88.
Total consumer surplus would therefore be $31,155.08.
189 $46,730 (producer surplus) + $31,155 (consumer surplus) = $77,885 (total welfare).
190 With zero costs, the profit-maximizing price for any demand function Q = A - BP
will be A/2B. See supra note 169. Thus, for the functions Q = 150 - P, (the demand function
for the one-cartridge group), Q = 150 - P,12 (two-cartridge group), Q = 150 - P,/3 (three-
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discrimination by charging $0 for the printer but tying in cartridges at the
supracompetitive price of $75 per cartridge. Under this pricing scheme, the
monopolist would sell 300 printers 191 and 750 cartridges, 192 generating profits
of $56,250,193 consumer surplus of $28,125,194 and total welfare of $84,375.195
Thus, tying-induced price discrimination using a more refined meter would
decrease static consumer surplus by 9.8% but would increase printer output by
33.3%, cartridge output by 3.2%, and total surplus by 8.3%.196
As the monopolist utilizes a more refined meter that divides the customer
base into a greater number of groups (i.e., as it "shrinks" the size of tied units so
as to increase the difference in the number of tied units purchased by high-
versus low-value purchasers), it will eventually hit a point at which its tying-
induced price discrimination will consistently generate greater total welfare than
charging a uniform monopoly price for the tying product. 197 Moreover, the
cartridge group), and Q = 150 - P,/4 (four-cartridge group), the profit-maximizing prices
would be $75, $150, $225, and $300, respectively.
191 Cf supra note 178 and accompanying text. Facing an effective price of $75, the one-
cartridge group (Q = 150 - Pp) would purchase 75 printers. Facing an effective price of
$150, the two-cartridge group (Q = 150 - P,12) would purchase 75 printers. Facing an
effective price of $225, the three-cartridge group (Q = 150 - P13) would purchase 75
printers. Facing an effective price of $300, the four-cartridge group (Q = 150 - P. 4 ) would
purchase 75 printers.
192 The one-, two-, three-, and four-cartridge groups, each of which would purchase 75
printers, would purchase 75, 150, 225, and 300 cartridges, respectively.
193 750 * $75 = $56,250.
194Total consumer surplus is derived by summing the consumer surplus enjoyed by
each of the buyer groups, and each group's consumer surplus equals 1/2(choke price -
Pm)(number of units purchased at Pm). See supra notes 173, 188. The one-cartridge group
would enjoy surplus of 1/2($75)(75) = $2,812.50. The two-cartridge group would enjoy
surplus of 1/2($150)(75) = $5,625. The three-cartridge group would enjoy surplus of
1/2($225)(75) = $8,437.50. The four-cartridge group would enjoy surplus of 1/2($300)(75) =
$11,250. Summing each group's consumer surplus generates total consumer surplus of
$28,125.
195 $56,250 (producer surplus) + $28,125 (consumer surplus) = $84,375 (total welfare).
196 While static consumer surplus would fall from $31,155 to $28,125, printer output
would rise from 225 to 300, cartridge output from 727 to 750, and total surplus from
$77,885 to $84,375.
19 7As Klein and Wiley explain:
The essential economic determinant of how closely a manufacturer using an aftermarket
metering arrangement can approximate the output increases of perfect price
discrimination is the accuracy of the meter in measuring intensity of package demand
above the non-discriminating price. If the meter is highly accurate in this regard, the
price increase to high-intensity users will not result in the loss of many sales to high-
intensity users. The meter will merely increase the package price across high-intensity
users in a way that collects varying levels of consumer surplus. On the other hand, sales
to low-intensity users that face a lower package price will expand.
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meter need not be all that highly refined. As Elhauge explains with respect to
his hypothetical tie-in of printers and cartridges:
Assuming equally sized groups with linear per-cartridge valuations that have
the same range for each cartridge .... intraproduct price discrimination
produced by tying increases printer output when the number of tied units is 4
or higher.... Tying-induced price discrimination lowers ex post total welfare
for 2 or 3 tied units, but increases it for 4 or more units.1
98
This is a significant concession that undermines Elhauge's claim that
metering tie-ins generally have negative static (ex post) total welfare effects. In
actual practice, one rarely observes a metering tie-in that effectively divides
consumers into only a small number of groups. In most tie-ins involving
variable proportions of complements, 199 the tied product is sold in small units
so that there is a large divergence between the volume of tied product purchases
by high-value and low-value consumers. Reported cases featuring tie-ins
apparently aimed at metering, for example, have involved punch cards (the tied
product) tied to calculating machines (the tying product),200 restaurant supplies
tied to a restaurateur's trademarks, 20 1 salt purchases tied to the lease of a
machine that turns salt into brine, 202 equipment service tied to the lease or sale
of capital equipment like copy machines,20 3 and ink tied to mimeograph
machines and printers.204 In all these cases, purchasers or lessees of the tying
product would vary significantly in the amount of the tied product they
purchased, so the monopolist would have effectively divided the consumer base
into a great many "groups." Thus, real-life metering tie-ins tend to employ the
sort of highly refined meters that consistently enhance total welfare.20 5 This
Klein & Wiley, supra note 31, at 613; see also id. at 613 n.29 ("The key economic factors
common to all forms of price discrimination are the number of implicit prices and how
precise prices are across sales relative to consumer value.").19 8 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 433; see also id. at 481 (showing that total welfare change
occasioned by moving from uniform monopoly pricing to metering price discrimination is
positive after cartridge size is reduced so that consumers are divided into at least four
groups).
19 9 If the tie-in involves only one tied-product complement (or a fixed ratio of such
complements) per tying product, the tie-in cannot occasion any of the so-called power
effects. Elhauge concedes that such tie-ins could cause no anticompetitive harm and should
be legal. See id. at 443 (observing that power effects are impossible if the tying and tied
products lack separate utility and are used or bundled in a fixed ratio).200 See Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
201 See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
20 2 See Int'l Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
203 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
204 See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
205 For other analyses that dispute Elhauge's conclusion concerning the static welfare
effects of metering tie-ins, see Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 27; Barry Nalebuff,
Price Discrimination and Welfare, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Autumn 2009, at 221. For
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should come as no surprise, for the monopolist can maximize the profitability of
its metering tie-in by selecting a meter that closely approximates consumers'
reservation prices (so as to extract as much consumer surplus as possible) and,
accordingly, makes relatively fine distinctions among consumers.
b. Stigler-Type Price Discrimination
Elhauge's discussion of the static welfare effects of tying-induced price
discrimination focuses almost entirely on metering tie-ins, which involve tying
a supracompetitively priced complement to the tying product. Elhauge quickly
disposes of Stigler-type tie-ins of noncomplementary products that do not
exhibit a strong positive demand correlation 20 6 by observing that such tie-ins
invariably reduce consumer welfare and that their "ex post total welfare effects
are mixed, with tying decreasing ex post total welfare unless allocation
inefficiencies are offset by output-increasing efficiencies." 20 7
Elhauge's "unless" is significant, for the Stigler-type tie-ins generally
observed in actual practice do involve significant output-increasing efficiencies
that likely offset any allocation inefficiencies. Stigler-type tie-ins are most
likely to be profitable where the marginal cost of each of the tied-together
products (over all of which the seller must have some market power) is low
relative to consumer valuations; otherwise, the effective discounts offered to
lower-value (high-elasticity) consumers may result in marginal revenues less
than cost. 20 8 Accordingly, as with Stigler's initial example involving the Loew's
case (which involved the tying together of motion picture exhibition rights), 209
most actual tie-ins aimed at eliminating the pricing constraints imposed by high-
elasticity buyers involve products with a low marginal cost of production and,
quite frequently, a high intellectual property component.
Work by economists Yannis Bakos and Erik Brynjolfsson demonstrates
how Stigler-type tying (or bundling, as it is more commonly termed) is
frequently an efficient pricing design for goods with a negligible marginal
cost-precisely the sorts of goods typically involved in such tie-ins.210
Specifically, Bakos and Brynjolfsson show how sellers of "information goods"
(generally defined as "anything that can be digitized," such as a movie, song,
Elhauge's response to Nalebuff's analysis, see Einer Elhauge, The Failed Resurrection of the
Single Monopoly Profit Theory, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, 155, Spring 2010, at 186-92.
2 06 See supra Part II.A.2.
2 07 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 434-35.
208See Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Bundles of Joy: The Ubiquity and
Efficiency of Bundles in New Technology Markets, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 1, 18
(2009).
209 See Stigler, supra note 44 (discussing United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38
(1962)).
210 Yannis Bakos & Eric Brynjolfsson, Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits,
and Efficiency, 45 MGMT. SCL 1613 (1999).
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book, or computer program 2t 1) can both extract additional consumer surplus
and overcome price-setting difficulties by bundling the goods they sell. Such
surplus extraction can then help overcome a difficulty that otherwise may lead
to an underproduction of nonrivalrous and other low-marginal cost goods.
Whenever there is a lack of perfect competition for a seller's good (so that
above-cost pricing is possible) and consumers vary substantially in their
reservation prices for the good, the seller will have a difficult time determining
its profit-maximizing price. Setting the price too low will leave money on the
table from high-value consumers. Setting the price too high will preclude sales
to those consumers, possibly great in number, who would be willing to pay a
lower, but still above-cost, price. In such circumstances, Bakos and
Brynjolfsson demonstrated, Stigler-type bundling can be quite useful to
multiproduct sellers. 212 If consumers demand either one or zero units of each of
a seller's goods and consumers' reservation prices for the goods are bounded
and independent, the law of large numbers assures that the variance of
consumers' average valuations of the components in a bundle will shrink as the
number of components in the bundle grows.213 This then implies that, as the
bundle grows, the variation of consumers' valuations of the bundle as a whole
will shrink in proportion to the bundle's total value. Eventually, the seller will
confront demand that is highly elastic around the median value for the bundle
but inelastic away from that value. 214 Thus, when the marginal cost for each of
the components in a bundle is negligible, the seller can maximize its profits by
tying many such goods together to "bunch" reservation prices and then setting
its price for the bundle just below the point at which reservation prices tend to
bunch. If it does so, most potential consumers will purchase the bundle. 215
2 1 1 See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO
THE NETWORK ECONOMY 3 (1999).
212 Bakos & Brynjolfsson, supra note 210, at 1613-14 (discussing utility to sellers of the
"predictive value of bundling").
213Id. at 1616 ("[A]s the number of information goods in the bundle increases, the law
of large numbers assures that the distribution for the valuation of the bundle has an
increasing fraction of consumers with 'moderate' valuations near the mean of the underlying
distribution.").2 14 1d. ("Since the demand curve is derived from the cumulative distribution function for
consumer valuations, it becomes more elastic near the mean, and less elastic away from the
mean ... ").
215 Bakos and Brynjolfsson summarize their basic insight as follows:
A strategy of selling a bundle of many distinct information goods for a single price
often yields higher profits and greater efficiency than selling the same goods separately.
The bundling strategy takes advantage of the law of large numbers to "average out"
unusually high and low valuations, and can therefore result in a demand curve that is
more elastic near the mean valuation of the population and more inelastic away from
the mean. As a result of this predictive value of bundling, profits and sales can be
increased, even as inefficiency (deadweight loss) is reduced.
Id. at 1627.
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In addition to helping the seller enhance its profits and extract additional
consumer surplus, such a pricing strategy is likely to enhance total welfare by
overcoming a problem plaguing sellers of nonrivalrous goods 216 and other
goods with significant fixed, but extremely low marginal costs of production.217
For such goods, the cost of supplying an additional user is negligible, so that
charging a nonnegligible (or, in the case of goods with zero marginal cost, a
positive) price for using the good is inefficient. The excessive price will
dissuade use by consumers who attach an above-cost, but below-price, value to
the good and will thus squander potential surpluses. 218 At the same time, if the
product at issue were priced at marginal cost, the seller would not be able to
recoup its total costs of providing the good.219 What is needed, then, is a pricing
mechanism that permits use by all consumers attaching an above-cost value to
the good but still provides the seller with enough revenue to cover the total cost
of producing the good.
Stigler-type bundling of the sort envisioned by Bakos and Brynjolfsson can
assist here. When the value of the individual elements in a bundle are
uncorrelated, the proportion of potential users that are willing to pay the
bundled price charged by the seller will expand as the number of bundled
elements grows. As long as an individual's willingness to pay for the desired
elements within the bundle exceeds the bundle's price, the individual will view
additional, undesired elements as having a marginal price of zero. Bundling
may therefore offer an imperfect solution to the difficulty afflicting sellers of
nonrivalrous and other low-marginal cost goods: It may enable the seller to
cover the cost of creating such goods while confronting buyers with a zero
marginal cost for any particular element of the bundle.220
It is difficult to conceive of real-world instances of Stigler-type tie-ins that
are not somehow alleviating the pricing dilemma affecting sellers of
nonrivalrous and other negligible-marginal cost goods. By contrast, examples of
216 A nonrivalrous good is one that can be consumed by one consumer without
preventing simultaneous consumption by others. Information goods are nonrivalrous.
2 17 See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 208, at 16.2 181d. at 19.219 Id.
220 1d. As Liebowitz and Margolis explain, the solution is imperfect for at least two
reasons: (1) even under this outcome, "consumers are confronted with a positive price for
the bundle, and some consumers will elect to forego the bundle even though [the] marginal
cost of providing it (zero) is less than the consumer's willingness to pay," id.; (2) the
bundling strategy "does not solve the standard problem of determining which goods to
produce. A bundle seller is not confronted with data on consumers' willingness to pay for
individual items in the bundle, only the willingness to pay for the whole thing." Id. With
respect to this latter difficulty, though, there are some mitigating factors. As Liebowitz and
Margolis note, depending on the nature of the bundle, sellers may be able to observe which
elements are most popular (e.g., cable operators can tell which channels are being watched
most heavily). Id. at 19-20. Moreover, "markets in which bundled public goods are sold are
not necessarily monopolies." Id. at 20. Competition among bundles can provide information
about which components are most valued.
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Stigler-type bundles that do help solve this pricing dilemma, and thereby
facilitate output, abound throughout the economy. Everyday examples include
music CDs that tie together multiple tracks, cable television packages that tie
numerous stations, computer programs that bundle disparate software programs,
news sources (print and electronic) that bundle all sorts of informational
components, etc. With all of these output-enhancing bundles, the potential for a
tying lawsuit lurks. If a consumer prefers one of the items in the bundle but not
the other(s), if the preferred item is not available separately and is one over
which the seller has market power, and if the tie-in affects a not insubstantial
proportion of commerce in the tied product market, then the seller has a facially
plausible claim. 221 Elhauge might argue that such claims would fail because the
monopolist could assert an efficiencies defense.222 But, as Part III.B.3 explains,
the efficiencies defense to which Elhauge points is not nearly as broad as he
suggests.223
2. Competition and Dynamic Efficiency Are Enhanced by Permitting
Monopolists to Extract Additional Surplus via Tying.
The preceding analysis, like the bulk of Elhauge's consideration of tying's
nonforeclosure effects, focuses on static welfare effects-those resulting from
the seller's sales and pricing strategy if we assume that its ability to enhance its
profits by engaging in tying is fixed. (Elhauge refers to these effects as ex post
effects because they occur after the seller has attained the market power that
permits it to enhance its profits by tying.)224 If we relax this assumption to
account for the possibility that a seller may influence its ability to gain the
market power needed to implement profit-enhancing tying, then the efficiencies
that result from permitting tie-ins that do not cause substantial market
foreclosure are even greater. Thus, consideration of dynamic efficiencies (which
Elhauge refers to as ex ante efficiencies, since they involve conduct occurring
both before and after the seller's attainment of market power225) further
221 Indeed, such a lawsuit has been filed against cable companies that engage in Stigler-
type bundling. See Jessica Dickler, Changing the Channel on Cable Costs, CNNMONEY
(Oct. 4, 2007, 12:31 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2007/10/03/pf/raw-deal-cable/index.htm.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed dismissal of this
lawsuit. See Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 649 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2011),
withdrawn, 2011 WL 5122495 (9th Cir. Oct. 31, 2011). The Ninth Circuit's reasoning
conflicts with Elhauge's contention that Stigler-type tying involves "anticompetitive" price
discrimination. See Thom Lambert, Ninth Circuit Moves Tying Doctrine in the Right
Direction: Will SCOTUS Follow?, TRuTH ON THE MARKET WEBLOG (June 7, 2011, 8:26
AM), http://truthonthemarket.com/201 1/06/07/ninth-circuit-moves-tying-doctrine-in-the-
right-direction-will-scotus-follow/.222 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
223 See infra Part III.B.3.
224 See Elhauge, supra note 9, at 426 (observing that analysis of ex post welfare effects
"ignor[es] any ex ante effects on efforts to obtain market power").
2 2 5 See id.
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weakens the case for policing tying's nonforeclosure effects under the antitrust
laws.226
Despite the fact that monopoly pricing redistributes wealth from consumers
to producers and reduces static efficiency by creating deadweight loss,227
American antitrust law has long permitted monopolists to engage in monopoly
pricing.228 That is because, in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, "The
opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what
attracts 'business acumen' in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces
innovation and economic growth. '229 The prospect of monopoly pricing has this
innovation-inducing effect because it spurs business competition by raising the
reward for developing a unique product or service for which substitutes are
limited.
To illustrate why the freedom to charge monopoly prices is, in the Court's
words, "an important element of the free-market system," 230 economists Dennis
Carlton and Ken Heyer posed a hypothetical involving a business, Firm A, that
must decide whether to pursue a risky software venture that could fail, costing
the firm its $5 million investment, or could succeed, generating profits of $50
million.231 Suppose that the managers of the business, after much investigation
and debate, decide that the risky gamble is just barely worth taking. Fortunately
enough, the gamble pays off, and Firm A begins to earn large profits (heading
toward the expected $50 million payout) by charging high prices for its unique
and highly valued new product. The local competition authority, upon learning
that Firm A is earning a rate of return several times higher than that earned by
similar firms, decides to cap the firm's prices at a rate that will produce a 100
percent rate of return ($10 million) on the initial $5 million investment.
Insisting that such a rate of return is plenty high to preserve incentives for future
innovation, the authority observes that its price cap will lower prices for
consumers, reduce deadweight loss, enhance static efficiency significantly, and
move output closer to the competitive level.
While Firm A's unregulated monopoly returns (ten times the amount
invested) would indeed seem exorbitant, it is important to remember that at the
226 Professor Steven Semeraro articulated a version of this argument in a brief response
included in the Forum publication that accompanied Elhauge's article. See Steven Semeraro,
Should Antitrust Condemn Tying Arrangements that Increase Price Without Restraining
Competition?, 123 HARV. L. REV. F. 30, 30 (2009) ("[G]ranting firms with market power
broad leeway to exploit that power actually benefits consumers over time so long as
competing firms are not restrained.").227 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 46-47.
228 Carlton & Heyer, supra note 20, at 1 ("[S]imple monopoly pricing.., is legal per se
under [United States] antitrust law."). Some foreign jurisdictions are not as lenient. See id. at
3 ("[T]he European Commission can attack excessive pricing as 'exploitive' under its
competition laws, though such attacks have been rare.").
229 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004).
2301d.
231 Carlton & Heyer, supra note 20, at 3-4.
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time of investment, Firm A contemplated such a high payoff for success and
was still just barely willing to pursue the high-risk venture. Had it known that
antitrust regulators might rein in its monopoly pricing, it would not have
pursued the venture in the first place, and both it and the consumers who chose
to buy its unique product would have been deprived of significant wealth.232
Perhaps more importantly, other businesses that currently or in the future find
themselves in Firm A's position would forego similar investments, squandering
potential surpluses.233
The well-accepted intuition this example generates-that monopoly pricing
facilitates dynamic efficiencies and should thus be permitted-similarly
supports the liberalization of tying-induced price discrimination. By allowing
the entrepreneur to capture more of the surplus her innovation creates
(represented graphically by the area between her marginal cost curve and the
demand curve for her product or service), tying-induced price discrimination
encourages innovation by increasing the reward for developing a unique
product or service for which consumers are willing to pay above-cost prices.234
Innovation, a central determinant of economic growth, tends to be retarded by
the fact that innovators generally capture only a fraction of the surplus their
efforts produce.235 Tying-induced price discrimination helps alleviate this
wealth-reducing positive externality. Moreover, unlike simple monopoly
pricing, which always reduces output to subcompetitive levels and creates a
static deadweight loss, tying-induced price discrimination tends to enhance
output and reduce the deadweight loss that would exist under simple monopoly
pricing.236 Thus, the case for permitting tying-induced price discrimination on
dynamic efficiency grounds is even stronger than the analogous-and well-
accepted-dynamic efficiency case for permitting simple monopoly pricing.237
2321d. at 4.
233 Id.
234 See Klein & Wiley, supra note 31, at 619 ("[P]rice discrimination allows producers
to recoup more of the social value of their innovations and thereby leads to more
innovation."); Semeraro, supra note 226, at 30 ("[T]he opportunity to charge [effectively
higher prices via price discrimination] encourages rival firms to invest in innovative
activities that are essential to a vibrant economy.").
235 As Jonathan Baker has explained, "From one generation to the next, innovation is
undoubtedly a central determinant of the welfare of humankind. Economists studying
individual projects, moreover, routinely find that the benefits of innovation to society as a
whole greatly exceed the benefits to the firms that develop the innovation." Jonathan B.
Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J.
575, 576 (2007). On the positive externalities associated with research and development, see
Timothy F. Bresnahan, The Mechanisms of Information Technology's Contribution to
Economic Growth, in INSTITUTIONS, INNOVATION AND GROWTH: SELECTED ECONOMIC
PAPERS 135-37 (Jean-Phillipe Toufflut ed., 2003); Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D
Spillovers, 94 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. S29 (Supp. 1992).
236 Klein & Wiley, supra note 31, at 619.
237 Admittedly, one reason for permitting simple monopoly pricing is that it would be
quite difficult for a court or agency to act as price regulator. By contrast, it would be
relatively easy for a court to preclude tying aimed at price discrimination. Absent this
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Elhauge rejects the view that tying-induced price discrimination enhances
dynamic efficiency.238 Invoking the literature on patent races, he first maintains
that firms often squander resources on attempts to innovate.239 He observes that
when numerous firms vie for a patent, many research efforts end up being
duplicative, and thus the total marginal benefit of a single competitor's effort
(i.e., the degree to which that effort increases the likelihood that a successful
innovation will be developed at all) is often less than the individual marginal
benefit the firm reaps from such effort (i.e., the increased likelihood that that
firm will successfully develop the innovation). 240 Any individual firm, though,
will make every effort that produces an individual marginal benefit exceeding
its marginal cost, even if the effort is socially wasteful in that the total net
marginal benefit it creates is less than its marginal cost.241 Accordingly,
Elhauge observes, efforts to attain patents often waste resources, and permitting
patent holders to increase the spoils of a patent through tying-induced price
discrimination would raise the stakes of patent races and thereby exacerbate
their inefficiency.
Elhauge then suggests that this patent race insight applies more generally to
all efforts to attain market power. Citing Judge Posner's claim that monopoly
profits tend to be dissipated by wasteful efforts aimed at securing monopoly
administrative consideration, though, the case for forbidding tie-ins aimed at price
discrimination is less compelling than the case for forbidding simple monopoly pricing.
23 8 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 439-42.
2 3 9 1d at 440 (citing SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 100-03
(2004); Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed
of R&D, 11 BELL J. EcoN. 1, 18 (1980); Pankaj Tandon, Rivalry and the Excessive
Allocation of Resources to Research, 14 BELLJ. ECoN. 152, 152, 156-57 (1983)).24 0 In other words, a development effort by an individual firm may make it more likely
that thatfirm will succeed in developing the innovation, without increasing the overall odds
that the innovation will be developed. Elhauge, supra note 9, at 440.
241 Elhauge explains:
[F]irms do not stop investing in efforts to create patents when marginal investment cost
equals the marginal social gain, but continue investing until it equals the average gain
from such an investment. For example, a firm would invest $1 million to be the
hundredth research team with a 1/100 chance of becoming the first discoverer of an
innovation that will generate $100 million in profits, even if having a hundredth team
does not meaningfully increase the marginal odds that someone will discover the
innovation.
Id. This is really an externality argument. The claim is that a single firm's efforts in a patent
race create negative externalities in that they reduce the chances of success of the other
competitors in the race. Given that the firm externalizes some of the cost of its research
efforts, it will tend to over-invest in research. See Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of
Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348, 349 (1968); Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and
Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561,
561 (1971); Klein & Wiley, supra note 31, at 617-18; Brian D. Wright, The Economics of
Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 691
(1983).
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power,242 Elhauge asserts that permitting tying-induced price discrimination
would enhance the reward for attaining the power to charge above-cost prices to
some consumers (i.e., the power to enhance one's profits via price
discrimination) and would thereby encourage socially wasteful efforts to attain
such power. He thus concludes that "considering ex ante [dynamic efficiency]
effects does not support allowing additional exploitation of market power. To
the contrary, considering ex ante costs increases the social loss from such
exploitation." 243
The problem with Elhauge's argument is that most efforts to attain the
power to price discriminate-a power often possessed even by firms
participating in highly competitive markets244-are not socially wasteful but, in
fact, enhance social welfare. 245 The sort of patent race to which Elhauge refers
involves a winner-take-all contest in which the efforts of non-winners are
simply squandered. It is akin to the competition for a monopoly taxi franchise
granted by a local government, where potential recipients of the franchise
would spend significant sums on socially wasteful lobbying, and raising the
value of the franchise by permitting the recipient to engage in price
discrimination would simply exacerbate the lobbying waste. 246
But this vision of a zero-sum game is inaccurate. Even in competitions for
patents, the efforts of non-prevailing competitors are not inevitably wasted.247
242 See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL.
ECON. 807, 807-09, 821 (1975). Elhauge summarizes Posner's argument as follows:
[C]ompetition to obtain market power dissipates the resulting monopoly profits
regardless of the source of that market power .... [Flirms will find it profitable to incur
costs to obtain market power up until those costs equal the expected monopoly profits.
If the costs were lower than expected monopoly profits, then more firms would incur
those costs to try to obtain the market power position, until the two equilibrated. Thus,
if one properly includes the costs of those who failed to obtain the market power
position, the total firm costs of obtaining market power will dissipate the resulting
monopoly profits.
Elhauge, supra note 9, at 441 (footnotes omitted).
24 3 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 441.
244 See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45 (2006) ("[I]t is generally
recognized that [price discrimination] also occurs in fully competitive markets."); WILLIAM
M. LANDES & RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW 374-75 (2003); William J. Baumol & Daniel G. Swanson, The New Economy and
Ubiquitous Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying Defensible Criteria of Market
Power, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 661,662-66 (2003).
2 45 See Klein & Wiley, supra note 31, at 616-17.
246Id. at 616.
247 As Landes and Posner have observed:
Two qualifications to the economic criticism of patent races should be noted. First,
the research expenditures by the losers of the race may not be wasted even if the race
does not accelerate the inventive process by a day, for the expenditures will generate
information that the losers may be able to use in other projects. Second, patent races
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Moreover, efforts to attain the power to engage in tying-induced price
discrimination are significantly less likely to be wasteful than are efforts to win
a patent race. To engage in price discrimination, all a seller needs is (1) a
downward-sloping demand curve for his product (indicative of the fact that the
product lacks perfect substitutes so that some consumers are willing to pay
relatively high prices for it), and (2) some means to administer the system of
discriminatory pricing (i.e., to segregate consumers and charge them different
prices, while avoiding arbitrage). When it comes to tying-induced price
discrimination, the tie-in provides the latter requirement. Thus, the seller needs
only to distinguish his product or service so that some consumers will deem it
unique and pay above-cost prices for it. Given that there are myriad ways to
distinguish one's product, it is unlikely, for any particular distinction, that so
many competitors will be vying for that niche that losers' efforts will be
wasted.248 Thus, the situation is a far cry from a patent race or franchise
competition where many firms compete in a winner-take-all contest.249
need not produce any social waste at all in cases... in which there are as it were
multiple prizes and hence more than one winner.
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 244, at 301.
248 Some may contend that permitting tying-induced price discrimination, thereby
increasing the reward for selling a differentiated product, may encourage "too much" brand
differentiation. But brand differentiation efforts-a mainstay of business competition-are
quite common in highly competitive markets, and antitrust tribunals are in a poor position to
determine when, if ever, efforts at brand differentiation cause more harm than good. As
Klein and Wiley have argued:
It is also not the role of antitrust to determine, for example, that there are too many
restaurants in the economy or that restaurants are of too diverse a variety because of
price discrimination. We look to the unsupervised competitive market process and not
to antitrust law to settle such issues.
Klein & Wiley, supra note 31, at 620.249 As Klein and Wiley have explained:
This monopoly franchise analysis does not apply to the usual competition for the
ability to price discriminate that occurs in the marketplace. In particular, this analysis
assumes competition is for an artificially created monopoly asset and is taking place
through socially wasteful lobbying. In contrast, competition in the usual marketplace
context is for assets (such as intellectual property) that permit a firm to produce
differentiated (but not necessarily monopoly) goods that give it the ability to price
above marginal cost and to price discriminate. Competition for these assets proceeds via
investments that are socially productive, not socially useless. Moreover, this investment
process occurs in a competitive context, where any increased profit from price
discrimination is passed on to consumers in the form of additional investments along
whatever dimensions give the firm the ability to price above marginal cost and price
discriminate. For example, firms might spend more to create a greater variety of
products, to improve their brand names, to multiply their retail outlets, or to undertake
R&D for product improvement. The range of potential investments is limited only by
the imagination of smart people who would like to make more money, which they only
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Elhauge's analogy to patent races and his attempt to downplay the dynamic
efficiencies created by permitting tying-induced price discrimination therefore
fail.
3. The Prevailing Liability Rule Does Not Permit Welfare-Enhancing
Tie-Ins.
Elhauge's primary argument in defense of current tying doctrine, which
does not require a plaintiff to establish significant tied market foreclosure, 250 is
that tying's nonforeclosure, price-discrimination effects are inefficient. But,
perhaps anticipating the efficiency arguments set forth above, he also asserts a
back-up argument: he maintains that reform of tying doctrine is unnecessary
because the prevailing liability rule would acquit particular instances of tying
that are, in fact, efficient. Contending that "the quasi-per se rule prohibits ties
only when a defendant with market power cannot prove an offsetting
efficiency,"'251 he maintains that "in those cases where tying-induced price
discrimination does increase ex post [i.e., static] total welfare, the defendant
should be able to prove an output-increasing efficiency [that offsets any adverse
effects], which would make quasi-per se rule condemnation inapplicable." 252 In
actuality, the Supreme Court has never recognized a general efficiencies
defense for those tie-ins deemed per se illegal.
Elhauge locates the genesis of the purported efficiencies defense in
Independent Ink.253 After arguing (incorrectly) that the Independent Ink Court
deemed tying's price-discrimination effects to be anticompetitive, 254 he asserts
that "it is actually a misnomer to refer to current tying doctrine as a quasi-per se
rule." 255 He says that the prerequisites to per se condemnation-tying market
power and a "not insubstantial" effect on dollar volume in the tied market-are
usually sufficient to establish tying-induced price discrimination,256 so the
liability test actually "requires proof of the elements necessary to achieve
anticompetitive effects." 257 He then makes the following curious remarks:
can do by creating things for which consumers are willing to pay. Under typical
circumstances, therefore, competition for the ability to price discriminate is not
necessarily wasteful at all but is very likely to be socially efficient.
Id. at 616-17.250 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
251 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 430; see also id at 401, 427.
252Id. at 434.
253Id. at 425 (discussing reasoning in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,
547 U.S. 28, 42-46 (2006)).254 See supra notes 110-23 and accompanying text.
2 55 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 425.
256 They are insufficient, according to Elhauge, only in the narrow set of cases in which
(1) the tie-in involves fixed proportions of the tying and tied products, and (2) the products
lack separate utility. See supra notes 11, 81 and accompanying text.2 57 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 425.
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Perhaps references to a quasi-per se rule were meant to reflect a notion in older
cases that ties lacked any procompetitive justifications. But the Court has
always considered procompetitive justifications before rejecting them, and
[Independent Ink] affirmatively states that the Court now accepts the view that
ties can have procompetitive justifications. It thus now seems likely that a tie
can be justified by evidence that the tie is the least restrictive way to achieve
efficiencies large enough to offset the anticompetitive effects.
Accordingly, today it is more accurate to read Supreme Court precedent
on tying as embracing a rule of reason, where anticompetitive effects must be
shown or inferred and procompetitive justifications are admissible.258
The Supreme Court would likely be surprised to learn that it had, in a
unanimous opinion purporting to address a narrow issue,2 59 abrogated a per se
rule that it recently deemed so historically entrenched as to be beyond
question. 260 According to Elhauge, the Independent Ink Court held that a tie of
unpatented ink to patented printers "was... illegal upon proof of market power
over printers, absent offsetting efficiencies.''26 1 But the Court never suggested
that the tie-in at issue could escape condemnation if the defendant established
offsetting efficiencies. While it remanded the case so that the plaintiff, which
had relied on precedents suggesting that tying market power would be
presumed, could have an opportunity to prove such power,262 it neither
instructed the lower court to consider offsetting efficiencies in determining
liability nor suggested that such efficiencies would save a tie-in that satisfied
the Jefferson Parish test for per se illegality.
Perhaps Elhauge's inference that the Independent Ink Court embraced a de
facto rule-of-reason analysis (complete with an efficiencies defense) is based on
the Court's observation that its "strong disapproval of tying arrangements has
substantially diminished" over the years and its express rejection of the
assumption that .' [t]ying arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the
suppression of competition."' 263 But the Court noted that it had rejected that
assumption as far back as the 1977 Fortner 1I decision.2 64 If its rejection of the
assumption effectively transformed the per se rule against tying into a rule-of-
2 58 Id. at 425-26 (footnote omitted).
2 5 9 See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text (discussing narrowness of issue
presented in Independent Ink).260 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984) ("It is far too
late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying
arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are
unreasonable 'per se."').
261 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 425 (emphasis added) (citing Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep.
Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42-43 (2006)).
2 62 Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. at 46.26 3 Id. at 35 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949)).
264 Id. at 36 (observing that assumption had been rejected in United States Steel Corp. v.
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. (Fortner I1), 429 U.S. 610 (1977)).
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reason analysis, as Elhauge seems to assume, then that transition occurred thirty
years before Independent Ink. In its 1984 Jefferson Parish decision, though, the
Court expressly distinguished two types of tie-ins: those that are per se illegal
(because the seller has market power over the tying product) and those that are
subject to a rule-of-reason analysis (because the seller lacks such power).265 If,
as Elhauge suggests, the Court's recognition that tie-ins may have
procompetitive effects renders all tie-ins subject to a de facto rule of reason that
includes an efficiencies defense, then it would have made little sense for the
Jefferson Parish Court to draw an express distinction between per se illegal tie-
ins and those that are subject to an inquiry into actual market effects under the
rule of reason.266 It would be especially odd to distinguish between those two
categories of tie-ins but then permit offsetting efficiencies to be considered for
both. Thus, one should not conclude that the Court's admission that tie-ins may
enhance competition-a concession it made as far back as 1977-creates a
general efficiencies defense in tying cases and abrogates the per se rule against
tie-ins meeting the traditional criteria for per se condemnation.
This is not to say, of course, that efficiencies are altogether irrelevant in
deciding whether to condemn a tie-in under the per se rule. Current tying
doctrine does make some accommodation for efficient tie-ins, but it does not do
so through a general efficiencies defense that would acquit metering (and other)
tie-ins that result in output-enhancing price discrimination. The accommodation
for (some) efficient tie-ins has instead occurred by requiring tying plaintiffs to
establish that the challenged product offering is a tie-in of multiple products
(e.g., printer and ink cartridge) rather than an integrated single product (e.g., a
pair of shoes--one left and one right). Plaintiffs typically must do so by
showing an absence of obvious efficiencies resulting from the joint provision of
the purportedly separate products. 267 As Judge Posner has explained:
The problem is that there is no obvious way of deciding whether a product
is a single product or an assemblage of components. The practice has been to
classify a product as a single product if there are rather obvious economies of
joint provision, as in the left-shoe-right-shoe example. Although this approach
seems to take what would otherwise be a matter of defense and make its
absence a threshold requirement of the offense, it does serve to screen out
many silly cases.26 8
265Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15-16 (distinguishing per se illegal tie-ins from those
to be analyzed under rule-of-reason).
266 Indeed, the Jefferson Parish Court referred to per se illegal tie-ins as those subject to
"condemnation without inquiry into actual market conditions." Id at 15. This
characterization suggests that a court should not consider the efficiency effects of tie-ins
falling within the ambit of the per se rule.2 6 7 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 483-84.
268 Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 1984)
(citations omitted).
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While this approach does provide what is, in effect, an efficiencies
"defense" for some product offerings involving literal tie-ins,269 it is focused
solely on one type of efficiency: that resulting from economies of joint
provision. Contrary to Elhauge's suggestion, it would not generally acquit
"those cases where tying-induced price discrimination does increase ex post
total welfare."270 Nor have courts recognized any general efficiencies defense
that would do so.
Elhauge's challenge to the view that tying liability should be limited to tie-
ins involving substantial tied market foreclosure therefore fails. As a descriptive
matter, the Supreme Court has not recognized the nonforeclosure effects of
tying as "anticompetitive" effects.271 As a normative matter, tie-ins that do not
involve substantial tied market foreclosure generally enhance static and, more
importantly, dynamic efficiency and should be permitted.272 Because current
tying doctrine fails to acquit a great many efficiency-enhancing tie-ins,273 the
Supreme Court would do well to abrogate the current quasi-per se rule against
tying and replace it with a rule of reason that focuses on the degree to which a
challenged tie-in forecloses marketing opportunities within the tied product
market and includes a genuine efficiencies defense.
IV. WHY SOME FORM OF BELOW-COST PRICING SHOULD BE A
PREREQUISITE TO BUNDLED DISCOUNTING LIABILITY
Like his tying analysis, Elhauge's analysis of bundled discounts challenges
a proposition that efficiency-minded antitrust scholars have largely embraced-
in this case, the near-consensus view that there should be a safe harbor for
bundled discounts resulting in prices that are, in some sense, above-cost.2 74
Once again, his challenge is unfounded.
Scholars and commentators have long recognized that bundled discounts
are a different competitive animal than straightforward, single-product price
cuts.275 When a seller cuts a single product's price to a level that equals or
269 Albeit, a "defense" whose absence the plaintiff must prove.
270 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 434.
271 See supra Part III.A.
2 7 2 See supra Part III.B.1-2.
273 See supra Part III.B.3.
274 See, e.g., AMC REPORT, supra note 5, at 12, 83, 99-100; BUSH DOJ SINGLE-FIRM
CONDUCT REPORT, supra note 5, at 101-02; Crane, supra note 5, at 474-75; Hovenkamp,
supra note 5, at 852-54; Lambert, supra note 4, at 1691 n.15; Muris & Smith, supra note 5,
at 425; Nalebuff, supra note 5, at 328-43.
275 See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 172 (explaining why "' [b]undled' discounts
may be different" than single-product quantity or loyalty discounts); Lambert, supra note 4,
at 1694-97.
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exceeds the seller's cost, any rival that is as efficient a producer as the seller
could match the discount.27 6 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that any
simple price cut resulting in a price exceeding the seller's cost (any "above-cost
price cut") is immune from antitrust liability.277 This is not because an above-
cost price cut can never occasion anticompetitive harm. Commentators have
recognized that so-called "limit pricing" may prevent the price-cutter's rivals
from attaining minimum efficient scale-i.e., from becoming an equally
efficient rival-and may thereby occasion anticompetitive harm.278 But
attempts to police above-cost price cuts aimed at preventing rivals from
attaining equivalent efficiencies would likely deter procompetitive discounts,
and the law therefore wisely limits predatory pricing liability to instances in
which the discounter prices below its own cost, charging a price that an equally
efficient rival could not profitably match.279
When it comes to bundled discounts, though, one cannot assume that any
rival that is currently as efficient as the discounter could match any discount
resulting in an above-cost price for the bundle.280 If the seller has monopoly
power over one product in the bundle (and thus charges an above-cost price for
that "monopoly product" if purchased alone) but faces competition on another
(and thus prices that "competitive product" near its cost), the seller can reduce
the price of the bundle by an amount equal to the difference between the cost
and the unbundled price of its monopoly product without pricing the bundle
below its aggregate cost. If purchasers typically buy both products in the
2 7 6 See 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 768b2, at
149 (2d ed. 2002) ("For single-item discounts, no matter how measured or aggregated, injury
to an equally efficient rival seems implausible."); Lambert, supra note 4, at 1694-95 ("An
above-cost single-product volume discount may always be matched by an equally efficient
competitor, for if the discounter's final prices are profitable (i.e., above cost), then any
equally or more efficient rival could offer the same price and remain in business.")277 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-24
(1993).
278See, e.g., JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 269-70 (2d ed. 1968); F.M.
SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
356-66 (3d ed. 1990); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 367-74
(1992); Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941, 941-42
(2002).2 79 As Hovenkamp has observed:
The source of this [Brooke Group] rule is not a robust belief that above-cost prices can
never be competitively harmful; many economists believe they can be, and many
above-cost anticompetitive pricing strategies have been modeled. One problem is that if
we admit claims of predatory pricing on above-cost prices there will be hundreds of
claimants, and the courts are simply not up to the task of separating out good from bad
claims.
Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 161 (endnote omitted). Hovenkamp thus concludes that "[a]n
intentionally under-deterrent predatory pricing rule may do much good by reaching many
instances of predation while permitting all instances of bona fide competition." Id280 See id. at 172-73; Lambert, supra note 4, at 1694-97.
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bundle, an equally efficient producer of the competitive product may find itself
excluded by this above-cost bundled discount. That is because any purchaser
contemplating whether to forego the bundled discount (i.e., to purchase the
monopoly product from the bundled discounter and the competitive product
from the discounter's equally efficient single-product rival) will have to pay full
price for the monopoly product and will thus prefer the monopolist's bundle
unless the single-product rival lowers the price of the competitive product by an
amount equal to the monopolist's overall bundled discount. Given that the
single-product rival is already pricing near its cost, it could not profitably do
so.28 1 Thus, an above-cost bundled discount, unlike an above-cost simple price
cut, could exclude an equally efficient rival.282
There is, though, a situation in which a bundled discount cannot exclude an
equally efficient single-product rival. If the discount results in an above-cost
price for the competitive product after the entire dollar value of the discount is
attributed to that product, then any equally efficient producer of the competitive
product could meet the discount simply by reducing the price of its product.283
Given this possibility, a number of courts and commentators have argued that
281 See, e.g., LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) ("The
principal anticompetitive effect of bundled rebates.., is that when offered by a monopolist
they may foreclose portions of the market to a potential competitor who does not
manufacture an equally diverse group of products and who therefore cannot make a
comparable offer.").282 The textbook example of the problem involves a bundled discount on shampoo and
conditioner. See Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 467
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). For a version of that stylized example (using slightly more realistic
numbers), suppose that manufacturer A sells both shampoo and conditioner, is a monopolist
in the conditioner market, and competes in the shampoo market against manufacturer B,
which sells only shampoo. B is the more efficient shampoo manufacturer, producing
shampoo at a cost of $1.25 a bottle compared to A's cost of $1.50 per bottle. A's cost of
producing a bottle of conditioner is $2.50. If purchased separately, A's per-bottle prices for
shampoo and conditioner are $2.00 and $4.00, respectively. But A offers customers a $1.00
bundled discount, charging only $5.00 for the shampoo/conditioner package. While this
discounted price is still above A's cost for the bundle ($4.00), it could tend to exclude B.
Assuming that shampoo buyers must also buy conditioner (in equal proportions), buyers
would have to pay A's unbundled conditioner price of $4.00 if they purchased B's shampoo
and would thus be unwilling to pay more than $1.00 for the B brand of shampoo. That price,
though, is below B's $1.25 cost. Thus, A's bundled discount would tend to exclude B from
the market even though (1) the discounted price ($5.00) is above A's aggregate cost for the
bundle ($4.00), and (2) B is the more efficient shampoo producer.
283 Consider, for example, a variation of the example in supra note 282. If A were to
limit its bundled discount to the amount by which its unbundled price for shampoo (the
competitive product) exceeded its cost ($0.50), then any equally efficient shampoo rival
could compete with A's bundled discount by lowering its price to the level of its cost. A
would charge $5.50 for its shampoo/conditioner bundle ($0.50 less than the aggregate price
of the two products if purchased separately), and any equally efficient shampoo rival could
stay in business by lowering its shampoo price to its (and A's) $1.50 cost, enabling
consumers to purchase a package consisting of A's $4.00 conditioner and the rival's $1.50
shampoo.
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there should be a safe harbor for bundled discounts that pass muster under the
so-called "discount attribution test," which immunizes bundled discounts that
result in above-cost pricing of the discounter's competitive product after the
entire amount of the discount is attributed to that product.284
Other efficiency-minded commentators have gone even further, arguing that
bundled discounts should be per se lawful as long as the discounted price of the
bundle exceeds the aggregate cost of the products in the bundle. 285 Those
commentators do not contend that discounts passing muster under their
proposed "aggregate discount" test can never be exclusionary. Instead, they
emphasize error cost concerns, arguing that bundled discounts resulting in an
above-cost price for the bundle are rarely anticompetitive and that attempts to
prevent anticompetitive instances of such discounting are likely to deter
procompetitive bundled discounting. 286 If that is true, then error costs (the sum
of losses from false acquittals of anticompetitive practices and false convictions
of procompetitive ones) may be minimized by a liability rule that immunizes
284 See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906 (9th Cir. 2008)
(adopting discount attribution test); BUSH DOJ SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT REPORT, supra note
5, at 101-02; Crane, supra note 5, at 474-75; Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 852-54;
Lambert, supra note 4, at 1691 n.15; Nalebuff, supra note 5, at 328-43; cf AMC REPORT,
supra note 5, at 12, 83, 99-100. While the AMC Report calls for an additional recoupment
element, such requirement makes little sense because bundled discounts are generally
profitable and therefore create no losses that the discounter must later recoup. See Carlton et
al., supra note 5, at 609.285 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 6 at 173-74; Muris & Smith, supra note 5, at 425. A
number of amici advocated this position in (unsuccessfully) urging the U.S. Supreme Court
to grant certiorari in the LePage's case. See Brief for the Boeing Co. et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 13, 3M Co. v. LePage's Inc., 542 U.S. 953 (2004) (mem.) (No.
02-1865), 2003 WL 22428377, at *13; Brief for Amicus Curiae the Business Roundtable in
Support of Petitioner at 6, 16, LePage's Inc., 542 U.S. 953 (No. 02-1865), 2003 WL
22428382, at *6, *16; Brief for Amici Curiae Morgan Stanley et al. in Support of Petition
for Certiorari at 5-7, LePage's Inc., 542 U.S. 953 (No. 02-1865), 2003 WL 22428378, at
*5-7; Brief of Washington Legal Foundation and National Ass'n of Manufacturers as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19, LePage's Inc., 542 U.S. 953 (No. 02-1865), 2003 WL
22428379, at *19.
286 As Hovenkamp has explained in arguing for the aggregate discount safe harbor:
The more serious problem with monopolization challenges to bundled discounts is
administrative. The great majority of discounts, bundled and otherwise, are
procompetitive. The anticompetitive bundled discount is the small subset that is
"excessive" because the discounts would be irrational but for their ability to exclude an
equally efficient rival. Making such determinations presumes that the court has much
greater cost-measuring capacity than it has in fact. Even though the theory of the
bundled discount is properly analogized to tying or exclusive dealing rather than
predatory pricing, an administratively prudent rule might insist on a showing that the
discounted package is priced below average variable cost.... Such a rule might be
somewhat underdeterrent, but it would eliminate most of the false positives that are
likely to occur if the courts permit challenges to above-cost discount packages.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 173.
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any bundled discount resulting in a price that exceeds the aggregate cost of the
products in the bundle.
While some advocates of the discount attribution rule would not go so far as
to endorse the aggregate discount rule,287 there does appear to be a good deal of
agreement among efficiency-minded antitrust scholars that there should be a
safe harbor for bundled discounts that are, in some sense, above cost. Elhauge
rejects that view.
A. Elhauge's Argument
In contesting the view that there should be some sort of price-cost safe
harbor for bundled discounts, Elhauge first rejects the notion that courts should
treat such discounts leniently on the ground that they involve price cuts. He says
that because a bundled discount occurs whenever "the defendant charges higher
prices to buyers who won't comply with a bundling condition than to buyers
who will," it need not involve a real price cut if the unbundled price for one or
both of the products is artificially set above the level that would persist in the
absence of the discounting scheme. 288 Suppose, for example, that the unbundled
prices of monopoly ("linking") 289 product A and competitive ("linked") product
B would normally be $9 and $7, respectively (aggregate price = $16), but that
the seller raises the unbundled A price to $11 (aggregate price = $18), while
offering to sell an A-B package for $17. The $1 bundled discount here is really
not a discount at all, Elhauge says, for the $17 "discounted" price exceeds the
$16 aggregate price of the products if sold separately in the "but-for" world-
i.e., in the absence of the bundled discounting scheme. 290
Elhauge therefore asserts that the first step in evaluating a bundled discount
should be to determine whether the apparent discount involves any real price
cut.291 To do so, he says, an evaluating court should ask whether the unbundled
price of the linking product ($11 in the example above) exceeds the unbundled
price that would exist if the bundled discount were not offered ($9 in the
example above). 292 If it does, Elhauge says, then the bundled discount involves
no real discount at all but instead merely permits a buyer to avoid a penalty for
not taking the bundled offering. 293 (In the above example, for instance, the
bundled discount really amounted to avoidance of a $1 penalty for purchasing A
287 See, e.g., Lambert, supra note 4, at 1691 n.15, 1705, 1742-53 (rejecting aggregate
discount test as underdeterrent but endorsing rule that would include discount attribution
safe harbor).2 88 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 450.
2 89 Elhauge refers to the bundled product over which the seller has market power as the
"linking" (analogous to "tying") product. The other bundled product is the "linked"
(analogous to "tied") product. See id
2 90 See id. at 450, 469.
291 Id. at 468-69.
292Id. at 451,468.
293 Id. at 450.
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and B separately rather than as a bundle.) Bundled price reductions that provide
no real discount from but-for price levels but instead simply allow the buyer to
avoid a penalty for failure to purchase both products are tantamount to tying,
Elhauge says.294 While buyers are not required by the seller to take both
products, as in a true tie-in, they are penalized if they do not do so.295 In an
extreme case, as when a seller offers products A and B for $10,000 and $10,
respectively, but sells an A-B package for $20, a bundled discount will have
precisely the same effect as a tie-in, for no one would ever purchase the
products separately.
Having contended that bundled discounts from artificially inflated
unbundled prices involve the same sort of coercion as tie-ins, Elhauge proceeds
to argue that such discounts may cause the same sorts of consumer harms.
Bundled discounts may result in metering ("intraproduct price
discrimination"), 296 he contends, if the seller sets the unbundled price of the
linking product at or above the "choke price" level (i.e., the level at which zero
units would be purchased) but then offers a "discount" to buyers who purchase
the linking product (e.g., the printer) at a competitive price and the linked
product (e.g., ink) at supracompetitive prices. All consumers will "voluntarily"
purchase both the linking and the linked products from the seller, and the
pricing scheme will permit the seller to charge higher effective prices to heavier
linked product users, who presumably attach a higher value to the seller's
linking product than do the consumers that purchase fewer units of the linked
product. 297
The effect resulting from Stigler-type tying ("interproduct price
discrimination") 298 is similarly achievable, Elhauge asserts, using bundled
discounting rather than tying.299 Suppose that the seller produces products A
and B at a marginal cost of $0 and has market power in both the A and B
markets. Buyer 1 values product A at $5 and product B at $9; Buyer 2 values
product A at $9 and product B at $5. Absent tying or bundling, the seller would
maximize profits by charging $5 for each product (the seller would sell 2 As and
2 Bs; total profit = $20). If the seller tied the products together and sold the
package for $14, each buyer would take the package, and the seller could raise
its profits to $28. But the seller could achieve the same result using bundled
discounting, rather than tying, if it raised the unbundled price for each unit
above the choke price. 300 For example, the seller could forego tying but achieve
2 94 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 468 ("When the linking product's unbundled price exceeds
its but-for price, bundled discounts have the same power effects as ties and thus should be
treated like ties by applying a similar quasi-per se rule. ").2 95 Id. at 450 ("[O1ne can think of tying as simply a special case of bundled discounts,
where the unbundled price on the linking product is set at infinity.").
2961d. at 404, 454.
2 9 7 Id. at 454-55.
2 98 Id. at 405, 455.
299Id. at 455.
3 00 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 455.
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the same result by charging $10 for A, $10 for B, or $14 for the A-B package.
All buyers would take the package, and the seller would earn profits of $28.
Tying's third purported power effect results when a seller imposes a sort of
two-part tariff in order to "extract individual consumer surplus. '30 1 The
intuition is that consumers who purchase multiple units of a monopolist's tying
product at the monopoly price likely value the first purchased units more than
the last and therefore enjoy some surplus on inframarginal units, even when the
product is priced at monopoly levels. If the monopolist could levy some
"charge" for the right to purchase its monopoly product at the monopoly price,
it could usurp some of that surplus for itself. Imposing a requirements tie and
charging a supracompetitive price for the tied product allows it to do so:
Agreeing to pay the monopolist a supracompetitive price for one's requirements
of the tied product is the "price" one pays for the right to buy the monopolist's
tying product at monopoly prices. As long as the consumer's surplus from his
tying product purchases exceeds the surplus loss he experiences from buying his
tied products at supracompetitive prices, rather than competitive prices, the
consumer will agree to the tie-in and will effectively transfer to the monopolist
some of the tying product surplus he would experience absent the tying
arrangement. 30 2 But a monopolist could achieve this same strategy without
engaging in tying, Elhauge says, by setting a high unbundled price for its
monopoly (linking) product but substantially discounting the price to buyers
who also purchase from the monopolist their requirements of a
supracompetitively priced, linked product. 30 3
Finally, Elhauge contends, bundled discounts could achieve the sort of
market foreclosure that decreases market competitiveness. 304 If a sufficient
number of buyers of the linking (monopoly) product take the bundle in order to
30 1 Id. at 407, 451.
302 See supra Part II.A.3.
303 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 451-54. Consider, for example, a printer monopolist that
also sells scanners (which are sold in a competitive market). Suppose that the monopoly
price of a printer is $200, its choke price is $950, the competitive price of a scanner is $50,
and its monopoly price is $100. The printer monopolist might extract individual consumer
surplus from buyers who purchase multiple printers by adopting a policy under which it
would sell unbundled printers for $1,000 but would give $800 discounts to buyers that
would agree to purchase all their required scanners from the monopolist for $100 each. A
multi-printer buyer who valued inframarginal printers a great deal may take this "bundled
discount." Take, for instance, a purchaser who buys eight printers and values his first at $900
and each additional one at $100 less (so $900, $800, $700, $600, $500, $400, $300, $200).
This consumer ascribes a $2,800 value to the right to purchase printers at the $200 monopoly
price ($700 + $600 + $500 + $400 + $300 + $200 + $100). To squander that value on
purchases of scanners at monopoly prices, the consumer would have to buy 56 scanners ($50
* 56 = $2,800). Thus, as long as the consumer's scanner requirements do not exceed 56, he
should assent to the monopolist's bundling condition. For each scanner purchased under the
bundled discount arrangement, then, the monopolist would usurp for itself $50 of surplus
that otherwise would go to the consumer.
3°41d. at 456-58.
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avail themselves of the bundled discount, rival sellers of the linked
(competitive) product may lose so many sales that they fall below minimum
efficient scale and are driven out of business. This may impair competitiveness
in the linked market and, to the extent a linked product could serve as a
substitute for the monopolist's linking product, in the linking product market as
well. 305
The foregoing observations lead Elhauge to propose the following approach
for evaluating the legality of a particular bundled discount: If the unbundled
price of the linking product exceeds the price the seller would charge for that
product absent the bundled discounting scheme (the but-for price), then the
bundled discount should be evaluated as if it were a tie-in-i.e., under the
prevailing rule that assigns automatic liability if (1) the discounting scheme
involves truly separate products, (2) the seller has monopoly power in the
linking product market, and (3) the discounting scheme affects a not
insubstantial amount of commerce in the linked product market. 30 6 If the
unbundled price of the linking product does not exceed the but-for price, so that
the practice cannot be analogized to tying, legality should turn on the
substantiality of foreclosure in the linked product market.30 7 If the plaintiff
establishes that the discount usurps so much linked product business as to cause
significant foreclosure of sales opportunities to linked product rivals (i.e.,
foreclosure of 20%-30% of opportunities), thus potentially causing those rivals
to fall below minimum efficient scale, it should be presumptively illegal. The
defendant could rebut the presumption of illegality by proving offsetting
efficiencies stemming from the bundled discount.308
For the reasons that follow, Elhauge's proposed approach to evaluating
bundled discounts is far too prohibitory and would ultimately impair
competition and injure consumers. 30 9
305 Id.
30 6 See supra note 83 and accompanying text (stating elements of liability under
prevailing tying doctrine).30 7 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 451, 468.
308 Id. at 451, 469-70.
309 The following catalog of arguments against Elhauge's bundled discounts proposal is
not exhaustive. Daniel Crane and Joshua Wright, for example, have persuasively criticized
Elhauge's proposal for prescribing heroic and unworkable efforts to address what is really a
non-problem: "phony" discounts aimed at achieving de facto tie-ins. See Daniel A. Crane &
Joshua D. Wright, Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding
Rivals?, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Autumn 2009, at 209, 211-15. Crane and Wright
contend that situations in which a monopolist artificially raises its unbundled linking product
price but then offers a faux bundled discount to achieve an effective tie-in are implausible or
at least unlikely to occur with frequency. See id at 212-14. They explain:
The central problem with Elhauge's argument is that the monopolist cannot obtain
much leverage by demanding a price above its profit-maximizing monopoly price.
Unless the monopolist has been engaging in some form of limit pricing, it has already
priced the monopoly product at the level that makes any further price increase
unprofitable. Consequently, any threatened price increase on the monopoly product to
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B. Problems with Elhauge's Proposed Approach
1. The Proposed Approach Would Employ a Faulty Screening Device.
Even if one assumes that the sort of phony discount strategy Elhauge
envisions is plausible,310 Elhauge's approach asks the wrong question to
determine whether a bundled discounting arrangement provides immediate
consumer benefit in the form of lower prices. In directing courts to begin their
analyses by asking whether the unbundled price of the discounter's linking
product exceeds the level that would persist absent the discounting scheme,
Elhauge assumes that a challenged discount can provide no consumer benefit-
and, thus, that courts should afford the discount no deference-if the unbundled
price of the linking product exceeds the but-for unbundled price. That is wrong.
As long as the discounted price of the bundle is less than the aggregate but-for
prices, then the bundled discount provides immediate price savings for
consumers. Consider, for example, a seller whose monopoly (linking) product A
costs $4 to produce and is priced at $7 in the but-for world and whose
competitive (linked) product B costs $3 to produce and, given market
competition, is priced at that level in the but-for world. Suppose that the seller
raises the unbundled price of A to $8 but offers buyers a bundled discount of
$1.50 on an A-B package (so the package sells for $9.50, rather than $11).
Absent the discounting scheme, consumers would have to pay $10 for products
A and B, so the bundled discount provides a benefit of $0.50 to consumers even
though the discounter raised the unbundled price of the linking product above
but-for levels.
A seller might employ this sort of pricing scheme if there were economies
of scope in the joint provision of products A and B.311 If, for example, selling
punish the buyer for failing to purchase the package would inflict costs on the seller as
well as the buyer. The threat to raise the "tying" product's price thus lacks credibility.
Id. at 212-13. For Elhauge's response to this argument by Crane and Wright, see Elhauge,
supra note 205, at 174-86. I do not here engage the Crane/Wright versus Elhauge debate,
focusing instead on other deficiencies with Elhauge's proposal.
3 10 See supra note 309.
311 Economies of scope are not necessary to make this sort of pricing scheme desirable
for a monopolist and consumers alike. Even without economies of joint production or
distribution, such a pricing strategy could enhance the monopolist's profits-and consumer
welfare-if the monopolist faced a double marginalization scenario. Consider, for example,
complementary products x and y, where consumers purchase both x and y; x is sold by
monopolist A; y is sold in an oligopoly market consisting of A, B, and C; and both x and y are
priced above marginal cost. (This sort of dynamic regularly occurs in markets with a high
intellectual property component, such as markets for medical devices, pharmaceuticals, and
software products. Bundled discounting schemes are common in such markets.) Suppose
that A produces x at a marginal cost of $5 and sells it for $9, and that A, B, and C each
produce y at a marginal cost of $3 and sell it for $5. Under these circumstances, A can
enhance its own profits and benefit consumers by raising the separate price of x but offering
a bundled discount on xy packages. With completely separate pricing, A earns profit of $4 on
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the products jointly saved the seller $1, it might wish to encourage purchasers to
take the products as a bundle. It could do so by raising the unbundled A price
and passing along some of the cost-saving to consumers who take the bundle. In
this example, selling the products under the bundled discount would provide
consumer benefit of $0.50 per package and enhance the seller's per-package
profits by $0.50. Thus, the question with which Elhauge would have courts
begin their analysis-Does the unbundled linking product price exceed the
separate price that would exist absent the discounting scheme?--does not, as he
assumes, identify those discounts that provide no immediate consumer benefit.
2. The Proposed Approach Is Inadministrable and Therefore Likely to
Create Legal Risks that Lead to Overdeterrence.
A second problem with the initial inquiry Elhauge directs courts to make is
that it is nearly impossible to answer in practice.312 How is a court evaluating a
challenged bundled discount to know what linking product price would have
prevailed had the discounter not adopted the challenged pricing scheme?
Because the linking product will always be one over which the bundled
discounter has market power, the court cannot simply look to competitive
market prices or the seller's own costs to determine the but-for price; there are
no competitive market prices, and the seller, given its market power, would be
expected to price at some level above its own costs.
One might suppose that the court could simply ask whether the unbundled
linking price exceeds the price the seller charged for the linking product prior to
initiation of the bundled discount (the "pre-program" linking price), but Elhauge
largely rejects that strategy.313 He observes that pre-program prices may exceed
but-for prices during the bundling period where, for example, the seller's costs
each x it sells and $2 on each y ($6 total), but it may frequently lose y sales to B and C, in
which case it earns only $4. If A continued to sell x at $9 but also offered a bundled price of
$13 (rather than $14) for an xy package, it would earn only $5 (rather than $6) per package,
but it would likely pick up more y sales from B and C. If A really wanted to pick up y sales,
it could raise the separate price of x to $10 but sell the xy package for $13. It would still earn
profits of $5 per package, but the inflated separate price of x would likely cause it to achieve
many more y sales. Despite the increased stand-alone price of x, consumers would benefit,
for they could secure an xy package for $13 rather than $14, the price they would pay absent
the discounting scheme.3 12 See Crane & Wright, supra note 309, at 212 (expressing skepticism "that identifying
the 'but-for' price of the linking, i.e., monopoly, product will be feasible in most cases").
Crane and Wright observe that "bundled discounts stories are usually far more dynamic than
[a] simplistic two-stage [i.e., before and after] analysis, with constantly shifting pricing and
discounting structures, product innovation, cost changes, and industry dynamics making it
impossible to determine clean before-and-after figures." Id. In addition, they note that "the
search for the but-for price is bound to run into the difficulty that... bundled discounts
often produce price discriminatory effects." Id.
313 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 468 (rejecting test "that would make bundled discounts
legal if the linking product's unbundled price is less than or equal to its pre-bundle price").
2011]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
are declining or its market power is eroding. 314 Moreover, he says, using pre-
program prices as a benchmark would create "an obvious loophole" because a
seller "could simply raise its pre-program price to a high level before it
institutes bundled discounts, so that the unbundled price is lower than the
artificially raised pre-program price but still exceeds the but-for price. '315 He
therefore would not permit courts to infer from the fact that unbundled prices
equal their pre-bundle levels that the seller has not artificially raised unbundled
prices from but-for levels.316 Instead, he directs courts to consider a
discounter's internal documents, which could reveal "that the business plan was
to raise the unbundled price in order to induce agreement to the bundle,"317 or
to rely on regression analyses or economic models to establish the but-for
price. 318 Alternatively, he contends, a court could simply presume that any
defendant that fails to establish an efficiency rationale for its bundled pricing
has raised its unbundled linking price above but-for levels in order to induce
buyers to take the bundle.319
If courts were to embrace Elhauge's approach and adopt his means of
identifying artificially hiked linking prices, any firm implementing a bundled
discount would face significant legal risk. Judicial reliance on internal
documents would invite plaintiffs to impose burdensome discovery requests in
the hope of discovering some "hot document" showing that the firm raised
unbundled linking prices so as to encourage customers to take the bundle.320
Given the difficulty and complexity of regression analysis and the
manipulability of expert opinion, any firm implementing a bundled discounting
scheme would need to be prepared to produce its own analysis to counter that of
a plaintiff's expert, who may well be believed on the basis of his charisma or
3 14 Id.3151Id.
3 16 1d. Elhauge would, however, permit courts to "presume[] that unbundled prices that
exceed pre-program prices also exceed but-for prices." Id. at 469. A defendant could rebut
such a presumption by "showing that costs have increased over time." Id. Thus, Elhauge
would afford pro-plaintiff, asymmetric treatment to plaintiffs and defendants seeking to use
pre-program prices as a referent in determining but-for prices: The fact that unbundled prices
equal their pre-program levels could not help a defendant avoid liability, but the fact that
unbundled prices exceed pre-program price levels could assist a plaintiff.
317Id. at 469.
3 18 Id.
3 19 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 469.
320 See generally Geoffrey A. Manne & E. Marcellus Williamson, Hot Docs vs. Cold
Economics: The Use and Misuse of Business Documents in Antitrust Enforcement and
Adjudication, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 609, 611 (2005) ("[T]he effort to collect business documents
that make out an antitrust case is extremely burdensome to antitrust defendants. '[S]earching
out intent tends to make antitrust litigation interminable... with massive discovery or a trial
that threatens to overburden the system .... ' (omissions in original)) (quoting 7 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA, ANTrrRUST LAW § 1506 (1986)). Accord Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 558-60 (2007) (discussing unusually high cost of discovery in antitrust cases and
consequent possibility of strike suits).
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presentation skills rather than the rigor of his analysis. 321 If a court were merely
to presume that any discounter that cannot produce evidence of efficiencies
occasioned by its bundled discount had artificially hiked its unbundled linking
price above but-for levels, then the discounter would have to come armed with
concrete evidence of bundled discount-induced efficiencies 322 and evidence that
the full discount was necessary to induce the requisite number of bundled
sales-i.e., that a smaller discount (or other incentive) could not have enabled
the firm to achieve the same efficiencies. 323 Taken together, the likelihood of
burdensome discovery requests, the need to counter manipulable expert opinion
about but-for price levels, and the obligation to prove bundling-induced
efficiencies would likely induce firms to forego proconsumer bundled discount
offerings.
3. Any Purely Power (Nonforeclosure) Effects of Bundled Discounts Are
Not Anticompetitive.
Fortunately enough, there is no need for courts to make the difficult
determination of whether a defendant's unbundled linking price exceeds the
but-for level. The sole reason for that inquiry is to identify (and ultimately
condemn) those bundled discounts that, while not generating substantial tied
market foreclosure, may occasion so-called power effects. As explained above,
though, the power effects to which Elhauge points are really just instances of
competitively benign (or procompetitive) price discrimination and surplus
extraction.32 4 As a positive matter, Supreme Court precedent does not deem
such effects to be anticompetitive. 325 As a normative matter, courts should not
condemn bundled discount arrangements on the basis of the price-
discrimination and surplus-extraction effects to which Elhauge points, because
such effects are unlikely to reduce total static welfare and are likely to enhance
dynamic efficiency (and long-term consumer surplus). 326 There is therefore no
need for courts to make heroic efforts to determine but-for linking product
prices and compare them to the unbundled prices offered by the defendant. An
evaluating court should instead focus on the extent to which a challenged
bundled discount forecloses sales opportunities for the defendant's rivals in the
linked product market. As explained next, however, the degree of linked market
foreclosure should not be the end of the inquiry.
321 See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 77-91 (discussing limitations of expert
testimony in antitrust cases).3 2 2 See Lambert, supra note 4, at 1724-26.
323See id. at 1711 (observing that under legal rule requiring discounter to show
efficiencies occasioned by discount, "the discount presumably could be no greater than
required to attain those efficiencies, for any incremental discount in excess of that amount
would effectively be raising rivals' costs [unjustifiably]").324 See supra notes 310-12 and accompanying text.
3 2 5 See supra Part III.A.
3 2 6 See supra Part III.B.
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4. Linked Market Foreclosure Is Anticompetitive Only if Occasioned by
Some Form of Below-Cost Pricing.
While substantial linked market foreclosure, a prerequisite to legitimately
anticompetitive effects, should be a necessary condition for liability based on
bundled discounting, such foreclosure should not be a sufficient condition for
imposing liability. Not all foreclosure-inducing conduct is anticompetitive. As
then-Judge Breyer explained, "[V]irtually every contract to buy 'forecloses' or
'excludes' alternative sellers from some portion of the market, namely the
portion consisting of What was bought. '327 If a seller usurps business from its
rivals by making an offer that is superior to theirs in terms of product quality or
(nonpredatory) price, the "foreclosure" at issue is simply the result of vigorous
competition. The main task in any antitrust challenge to foreclosure-inducing
conduct, then, is to determine whether the foreclosure or exclusion is
anticompetitive, or, to use the language of the case law, whether the defendant
has engaged in "unreasonably exclusionary" conduct.328 While a great debate
rages over how to identify unreasonably exclusionary conduct generally, 329
there is a good deal of agreement among courts and commentators that
foreclosure or exclusion is not "unreasonable" if it results from a plaintiffs own
relative inefficiency 330 or from the plaintiffs insistence on charging
supracompetitive prices (i.e., prices in excess of cost). 331
Building on this intuition, the aforementioned discount attribution test aims
to identify bundled discounts that could cause anticompetitive market
foreclosure. As explained above, a court evaluating a bundled discount under
the discount attribution test allocates the total dollar volume of the bundled
discount to the discounter's competitive product and asks whether that product,
if so discounted, is priced at or above its cost; if so, the discount is legal.332 The
theory underlying this safe harbor is that if the discounted price of the
competitive product equals or exceeds the discounter's cost even after the entire
amount of the discount is attributed to that product, then any equally efficient
327 Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 236 (1st Cir. 1983).
32 8 See Thomas A. Lambert, Weyerhaeuser and the Search for Antitrust's Holy Grail,
2007 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 277, 279.329 See id. at 278-86; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72
U. CHI. L. REv. 147 (2005).3 30 See, e.g., Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) ("[A] firm with lawful monopoly power has no general duty to help
its competitors, whether by holding a price umbrella over their heads or by otherwise pulling
its competitive punches."); Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley, 658 F.2d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir.
1981) ("The antitrust laws do not require the erection of a price umbrella for the benefit of
inefficient competitors.").
3 3 1 See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 857 ("[1]t is perverse to condemn package
discounts at the behest of a rival who is earning high margins on its own output of the
products upon which exclusion is claimed. Such a firm is telling us that it wants to use the
antitrust laws rather than competition to guarantee its place in the market.").332 See supra notes 283-84 and accompanying text.
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single-product seller of the competitive product could match the discount.333
The only sellers that would lose sales because of the discount, and thus might be
"foreclosed," would be either (1) less efficient than the bundled discounter, or
(2) unwilling to lower price to the level of cost (i.e., the competitive level).
Accordingly, no liability should stem from an instance of bundled discounting
unless the discount both threatens substantial linked market foreclosure and
results in below-cost pricing of the competitive product after the entire amount
of the discount is allocated to that product. Only under such circumstances
could the discount occasion a harm to competition itself.
Elhauge rejects this view. He maintains that the discount attribution test
may underdeter by permitting bundled discounts that cause rivals to be
relatively less efficient. 334 He also contends that the test may reduce consumer
welfare by permitting the exclusion of rivals that are less efficient than the
discounter but whose presence in the market ultimately benefits consumers.
335
Neither criticism undermines the discount attribution test.
a. Bundled Discounts that Pass Muster Under the Discount Attribution
Test Should Not Cause Competitive Rivals to Lose Scale Efficiencies.
If a bundled discount succeeds in attracting enough consumers to the
discounter's bundle, it may usurp so much business from rivals in the linked
product market that their output falls below minimum efficient scale. 336 In such
a case, Elhauge maintains, "The [linked market] rival cannot match th[e]
effective price [as discounted under the discount attribution test] precisely
because the bundled discount forecloses enough of the market to prevent it from
achieving the same costs as the defendant. '337 But otherwise equally efficient
rivals whose output falls below minimum efficient scale because of a bundled
discount (and entrants who would be equally efficient if able to grow to
minimum efficient scale) do not actually face such dire straits. Given well-
developed capital markets, such "competitive rivals"-those whose efficiency
would match or exceed the discounter's at minimum efficient scale-ought to
be able to procure the financing needed to achieve all available scale economies
and could therefore match any discount that passes muster under the discount
attribution test.338
3 33 See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
3 34 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 462-63.
335Id. at 463-64.
3 36 See supra note 61.
337 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 462-63.
338 See 2A PHILLEP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW 42 1(b), at 67 (2d ed. 2002) ("If
capital markets are working well, new investment will be made in any market earning
anything above competitive retums-a term defined to include sufficient profit to attract
new capital-regardless of the absolute cost of entry."); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE
ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67-69 (1968); Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM.
ECON. REV. 47, 49-53 (1982); Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and
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It is quite common for upstart rivals of established sellers to experience
periods in which they must price below their costs in order to grow their market
share to a point at which they achieve minimum efficient scale and thereby meet
or exceed the experienced firms' efficiencies. Indeed, virtually every new
business experiences some start-up or expansion phase in which its per-unit
costs exceed its per-unit revenue. Businesses must, for example, build
production facilities of the requisite size, produce marketing and advertising
materials, give away free samples to generate consumer interest, and incur all
sorts of other start-up costs. As the old saying goes, it takes money to make
money. Yet, businesses that truly have a superior offering (in that their products
are at least as good as their rivals' and can be produced as cheaply at minimum
efficient scale) routinely manage to muscle through these periods of below-cost
pricing and grow to a scale at which they achieve equivalent efficiencies. They
do so by convincing investors and lenders that their product is superior to
competing products and will eventually command enough consumer loyalty to
warrant production at the level required to attain all available economies of
scale. When they in fact have a "better mousetrap" and plausible plans for
efficiently producing that offering, they should have little trouble raising start-
up funds. 339 Thus, any competitive rival--defined as an aggressive competitor
that is as efficient as the bundled discounter or that would be so if it grew its
output to minimum efficient scale-could not be excluded from the market by a
bundled discount that resulted in above-cost pricing on each item in the bundle
after the entire amount of the discount was attributed to that item.
Public Policy, 16 J.L. & ECON. 1, 4 (1973); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of
Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 929-30 (1979). But see Richard R. Nelson,
Comments on a Paper by Posner, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 949, 950 (1979) ("The Chicago
proposition that scale economies don't serve as a barrier to entry hinges on explicit or
implicit assumptions about perfect capital markets and no adjustment lags or costs.").
339 As I have elsewhere explained in defending a rule of per se legality for above-cost
loyalty (single-product) discounts:
Just as a business must incur costs early on to establish the market share required
to achieve minimum efficient scale, it might-if its margins were not great enough to
fund a competitive discount-have to incur similar costs to recover market share from a
discounting rival and thereby protect or enhance productive efficiencies. But the fact
that it has to incur such costs does not mean it is being "excluded" from the market. If
the disadvantaged rival's product was as good as the discounter's and could be
produced as cheaply at minimum efficient scale, the rival should be able to raise enough
capital to fund any discount necessary to grow its market share to the point necessary to
achieve minimum efficient scale.
Lambert, supra note 4, at 1713-14. That argument applies with equal force in the bundled
discounts context.
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b. Creating a Price Umbrella for Noncompetitive Rivals Does Not
Further Competition or Enhance Dynamic Efficiency.
Elhauge, however, is not content with a rule that protects only competitive
rivals from discount-induced exclusion. He contends that even noncompetitive
rivals of a bundled discounter--"[e]ven... the set of rivals who could never be
equally efficient"-should be protected from exclusion via a bundled discount
involving an unbundled linking product price that has been inflated above but-
for levels.340 The exclusion of such rivals, he asserts, may harm consumer
welfare. 341 By way of example, he poses a scenario in which a bundled
discounter's cost is $100, its sole rival's is $150, and the monopoly price for the
product at issue is $200.342 Observing that exclusion of the less-efficient rival
would tend to increase price from $150 to $200, he asks, "Why should antitrust
law tolerate inefficient conduct that harms consumers, merely because another
harmed party is less efficient than the defendant?" 343
As an initial matter, Elhauge is wrong to assume that every bundled
discount that would be condemned under his liability rule amounts to
"inefficient conduct that harms consumers." As explained above, even bundled
discounts involving an inflated unbundled price for the linking product may
benefit consumers immediately by providing a lower total price for the products
in the bundle.344 Thus, restricting such discounts in an attempt to prevent the
exclusion of noncompetitive rivals would sacrifice static consumer welfare in
order to protect laggard competitors-hardly an appropriate outcome for a body
of law aimed at the protection of competition rather than competitors. 345 And
the outcome is far more perverse if one accounts for dynamic effects: An
antitrust policy that denied consumers lower prices because the discounter's
34 0 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 463.
341 Elhauge's point is similar to that which is asserted by several critics of the standard
Judge Posner has proposed as a generalized test for unreasonably exclusionary conduct.
Posner would condemn a monopolist's conduct as unreasonably exclusionary only if it were
capable of excluding an equally efficient rival. See POSNER, supra note 7, at 194-95
(defining exclusionary conduct as that which is "likely in the circumstances to exclude from
the defendant's market an equally or more efficient competitor"). Numerous scholars have
complained that this test is underdeterrent in that it might exclude rivals who are not as
efficient as the defendant but whose continued presence in the market could nonetheless
benefit consumers. See, e.g., HoVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 154; Marina Lao, Defining
Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The Case for Non-Universal Standards, in
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY 433 (Barry Hawk ed., 2006).342 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 463.
34 3 Id. at 463-64.
344 See supra notes 310-12 and accompanying text (explaining that as long as the
aggregate but-for unbundled prices exceed the price of the bundle, consumers are benefited
by the bundled discount, even if the unbundled linking price exceeds the but-for level).34 5 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) ("The
antitrust laws, however, were enacted for 'the protection of competition not competitors."'
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962))).
2011)
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
noncompetitive rivals might be excluded would weaken the incentive of
nondominant rivals to work hard to match the efficiency of their dominant
competitor and would thereby reduce dynamic efficiency and long-term
consumer welfare.
In addition, concerns about error costs346 counsel rejection of a rule aimed
at preserving noncompetitive rivals. Whereas the discount attribution test
provides discounters with an easily administrable safe harbor (i.e., a bundled
discount is per se legal if it could not exclude an equally efficient single-product
rival), Elhauge's competitor-focused liability rule offers bundled discounters no
guarantees. To ensure against antitrust liability and accompanying treble
damages, a bundled discounter would have to be able to demonstrate both that
its unbundled linking price had not been raised above but-for levels 347 and that
the discount did not occasion foreclosure of a substantial portion (more than
20% or so) of marketing opportunities in the linked product market.348 A
bundled discounter could face difficulty with the former showing because
unpredictable and easily swayed juries might become convinced that the
discounter's linking product cost had dropped or its linking market power had
eroded prior to initiation of the bundled discount, causing even a "level"
unbundled linking product price (i.e., one equal to the pre-bundle linking price)
to be artificially inflated. 349 With respect to the latter showing, any bundled
discounter would run a large risk, for it could not predict with certainty, at the
time it initiated its bundled discount, how "successful" the pricing arrangement
would be at winning business in the linked product market. Absent reliable
protection from treble damages liability under the antitrust laws, potential
bundled discounters would likely forego all sorts of pro-consumer discounting
arrangements. 350 By contrast, the discount attribution rule would protect all
346 Error costs are the sum of social losses resulting from the false positives and false
negatives generated by a liability rule. See generally Lambert, supra note 93, at 874-79
(defining error costs in antitrust context).
347 Otherwise, the discount would be treated as a de facto tie-in and, because the
discounter could not artificially raise the unbundled linking product price absent market
power in the linking product market, would likely be condemned under the quasi-per se rule.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
348 Otherwise, the bundled discount could be deemed illegal under Elhauge's proposed
rule-of-reason analysis. See Elhauge, supra note 9, at 469 (asserting that bundled discounts
occasioning linked market foreclosure of 20%-30% should be deemed illegal under a rule-
of-reason analysis).349 See Elhauge, supra note 9, at 468 (explaining that even a linking price that does not
exceed pre-program levels may have been artificially inflated).
350 Elhauge himself has recognized that vague liability standards applied by non-expert
jurors with the power to impose treble damages will tend to chill proconsumer, but untested,
business arrangements. See Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56
STAN. L. REv. 253, 266 (2003) (observing that overdeterrence is likely when "firms must
operate under the risk that the actual criteria by which their conduct will be judged will
depend largely on the happenstance of which judge and jurors will be selected in a trial a
great number of years later that will retroactively decide whether to assess multimillion or
even multibillion dollar treble damages").
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competitive single-product rivals from exclusion while creating a clear and
easily administrable safe harbor for bundled discounts that could not exclude
such rivals. The sum of social losses from over- and under-deterrence of
bundled discounting arrangements is therefore likely to be lower under the
discount attribution rule.
C. Appropriate Minimal Requirements for Liability Based on Bundled
Discounting
Because the initial inquiry Elhauge prescribes (i.e., Does the unbundled
linking price exceed its but-for level?) is not dispositive of a bundled discount's
effect on consumer welfare, 351 is exceedingly difficult to answer (thus creating
uncertainty that would likely chill desirable discounting), 352 and is irrelevant to
whether a bundled discount creates truly anticompetitive harms,353 courts
should eschew it altogether and instead focus from the outset on the degree to
which a challenged discount generates linked market foreclosure. But
substantial linked market foreclosure, by itself, should not be enough to create
antitrust liability. Before condemning a foreclosure-causing discount, an
evaluating court should ensure that the foreclosure occasioned by the discount is
anticompetitive-i.e., that it is not simply the result of price-cutting that an
aggressive, competitive rival could match. To make that determination, a court
should ask whether the challenged bundled discount results in above-cost
pricing of the competitive product(s) under the discount attribution test; if so,
the discount could be matched by a determined, competitive rival, can cause no
anticompetitive harm, and should be insulated from liability. Thus, both
substantial linked market foreclosure and below-cost pricing under the discount
attribution test should be minimal prerequisites to antitrust liability based on
bundled discounting.354
I do not address here whether substantial linked market foreclosure and
below-cost pricing under the discount attribution test should be sufficient, as
opposed to merely necessary, conditions to bundled discounting liability. I have
elsewhere answered that question in the negative, advocating a liability rule that
351 As explained above, a bundled discount involving an unbundled linking price that
exceeds the but-for level may still provide immediate consumer benefit in the form of lower
prices. See supra notes 310-12 and accompanying text.
352 See supra Part IV.B.2.
353 See supra Part 1V.B.2.
354 In terms of proof burdens, the plaintiff should have the burden of proving that the
discount at issue has caused or is likely to cause substantial foreclosure (i.e., > 20%-30%) of
the linked market. Upon such a showing, the burden should probably shift to the defendant
to prove that its discount is above-cost under the discount attribution test. While below-cost
pricing is a prerequisite to anticompetitive harm and would thus seem to be part of the
plaintiff's prima facie case, the defendant is in a much better position to present evidence on
the prices and costs of its own products, and it thus makes most sense to treat above-cost
pricing (under the discount attribution test) as an affirmative defense.
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would require a plaintiff challenging a bundled discount to make several
additional showings to establish its inability to avoid exclusion via vigorous
competition. 355 While I stand by my initial proposal, my point here has been
merely to rebut Elhauge's seductive claim that no form of below-cost pricing
should be a prerequisite to antitrust liability based on bundled discounting. For
the reasons set forth above, both substantial linked market foreclosure and
below-cost pricing under the discount attribution test are, in fact, necessary for
bundled discounting to occasion truly anticompetitive harm, and both should be
required for an instance of bundled discounting to give rise to antitrust liability.
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Einer Elhauge has made numerous valuable contributions to
antitrust scholarship. The provocative article discussed herein is no exception.
Masterfully synthesizing a great deal of learning on the potential price
discrimination and foreclosure effects of tying and bundled discounting,
Elhauge's article promises to rein in overly broad claims about tying's futility
(occasioned by a failure to appreciate the restrictive assumptions underlying the
single monopoly profit theory) and about bundled discounting's resemblance to
predatory pricing (occasioned by a failure to recognize how bundled discounts
may resemble tie-ins). For that, Elhauge should be heartily congratulated.
But Elhauge's ultimate conclusions are flawed. Supreme Court precedent
does not hold that tying's price-discrimination effects are anticompetitive and a
proper concern for antitrust. Tying-induced price discrimination does not
usually reduce total or consumer welfare. In fact, when dynamic effects are
considered, tying-induced price discrimination likely enhances both total and
consumer welfare by spurring vigorous competition. Accordingly, tying may
cause anticompetitive effects only when it involves substantial tied market
foreclosure, and such foreclosure should therefore be a prerequisite to tying
liability.
Elhauge's mistakes about tying throw him off track when it comes to
bundled discounts. His mistaken conclusion that tying's nonforeclosure, price-
discrimination effects are anticompetitive leads him to propose an impossible-
to-administer test to identify bundled discounts that have tying characteristics
but do not occasion substantial linked market foreclosure. That test, which is
not properly calibrated to identify bundled discounts that create no immediate
consumer benefit and is so inadministrable that it would likely chill consumer-
friendly bundled discounts, would be unnecessary if courts properly deemed
substantial linked market foreclosure to be a prerequisite to bundled discounting
liability. They should do so. Moreover, they should ensure that the foreclosure
35 5 See Lambert, supra note 4, at 1739-53 (proposing a liability rule that would require a
plaintiff complaining of a bundled discount to establish (1) the existence of entry barriers to
the linking and linked markets, (2) the impracticability of coordinating a competing bundle,
and (3) that it unsuccessfully sought to avoid exclusion by becoming a supplier to the
bundled discounter).
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at issue is anticompetitive foreclosure-foreclosure that could not be avoided by
a determined, competitive rival. To make that determination, they should
consider whether the bundled discount results in a below-cost price for the
competitive product after the entire amount of the discount is attributed to that
product; if not, it could be matched by any determined rival that is as efficient
as the discounter or would be so upon reaching minimum efficient scale. Thus,
a form of below-cost pricing should be a prerequisite to antitrust liability based
on bundled discounting.
The Roberts Court has shown a significant interest in antitrust matters,
356
and scholars have predicted that it may soon consider whether to abrogate the
quasi-per se rule against tying and replace it with the sort of foreclosure-focused
rule of reason applicable to exclusive dealing.357 The Court may also be called
upon to resolve the current circuit split over the existence of a discount
attribution safe harbor for bundled discounting.358 In either event, the Court will
no doubt encounter Professor Elhauge's seductive ideas about the appropriate
prerequisites to liability for tying and bundled discounting. For the reasons
stated herein, it should reject them.
3 56 See Einer Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent
Supreme Court Decisions?, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Autumn 2007, at 59, 60 ("After a
long antitrust slumber, the Supreme Court has become active again in antitrust law, deciding
seven cases in the last two years."); Joshua D. Wright, The Roberts Court and the Chicago
School of Antitrust: The 2006 Term and Beyond, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Autumn 2007,
at 24, 25 ("The antitrust activity level of the Roberts Court thus far has exceeded the single
case average of the Court prior to the 2003-2004 Term by a significant margin.").
357 See, e.g., Wright, supra note 356, at 56 ("[Tlhe Roberts Court will overturn Jefferson
Parish's modified per se rule in favor of the rule of reason, thus eliminating the last vestiges
of the hostile approach to vertical contracting practices of antitrust eras past.").
358 Compare Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906 (9th Cir.
2008) (endorsing discount attribution safe harbor), with LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141,
152 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (eschewing price-cost comparison in evaluating legality of
bundled discounts).
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